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Executive Summary 
 
A central theme in the development of the Canadian health care system has been a public 
commitment to remove financial barriers to necessary care.  The Medical Care Act of 1965 and 
the subsequent Canada Health Act of 1984 outline a set of principles that define a national public 
insurance system for “medically necessary” physician and hospital care.  Although drugs taken 
outside of hospitals are not covered under the Canada Health Act, each provincial government 
has established some form of drug insurance program for selected beneficiary groups, including 
seniors (those 65 years and older), those receiving social assistance income, and those residing in 
long term care facilities.  A system of parallel private insurance covers primarily the “general 
population”: those under 65 who are not receiving social assistance.  Yet, many individuals 
ineligible for public coverage do not have good access to private coverage and others remain 
underinsured.  In response, the National Forum on Health recommended that the current 
patchwork quilt of private and public drug coverage be replaced by a national pharmacare 
program, with the same terms and conditions as currently exists for medical services, including 
the removal of any financial barriers to prescription drugs. 
 
The establishment of such a policy could have far-reaching impacts on the health care system.  
First, patient health could be improved if financial barriers which previously limited access to 
essential medications were removed.  Second, a reduction in the user cost of prescription 
medicines would potentially affect the overall use of and expenditures on prescription medicines, 
as patient ability to pay no longer constrained access.  Third, a reduction in the user cost of 
prescription medicines would potentially affect the use of other health services includ ing over 
the counter medicines (at least those which are substitutable for prescription medicines) and 
physician services (patients might be more apt to visit the physician if they know that any 
prescriptions received will be free of charge).   
 
Despite these potentially important effects of prescription drug user fees on the health system, 
the evidence on their effects is incomplete.  There is no information on the direct effect of user 
fees on patient health, and little recent Canadian evidence on the effects of user fees on the use of 
prescription drugs, over the counter drugs and physicians’ services.  There are also gaps in our 
knowledge of the extent of prescription drug insurance among Canadians.  While recent studies 
have estimated the number of Canadians by level of drug insurance coverage (full, partial or 
none) and by various socio-economic and demographic characteristics (such as age, sex and 
employment status), less attention has been paid to the distribution of direct charges for 
prescription drugs paid by senior and social assistance beneficiaries of the provincial drug plans 
and how these charges vary by province.  There is also little known about the socio-economic 
and demographic determinants of prescription drug insurance coverage among the population 
typically ineligible for comprehensive drug coverage from the provincial drug plans.  We used 
data from the 1994 and 1996 Statistics Canada National Population Health Surveys (NPHS) to 
address these questions and hopefully improve the evidential basis for decision making by 
provincial drug program policy makers and others considering national pharmacare. 
 
In order to estimate the distribution of drug charges, we first identified seniors and social 
assistance recipients in the NPHS and then determined which provincial drug plan they would 
likely receive drug coverage from.  Finally, we applied the plan-specific cost sharing rules to 
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examine the price that these individuals pay for their drugs.  To identify the determinants of 
prescription drug coverage among the general population, we modeled whether or not these 
individuals reported having insurance coverage as a function of a variety of their socio-
economic, demographic and health characteristics.  These models permitted us to assess the 
relative importance of specific factors such as income on drug insurance, while holding constant 
potentially confounding factors such as age and education. 
 
To assess the effects of drug charges on health outcomes, drug use, and use of physicians’ 
services, we deve loped statistical models of these outcomes as a function of drug insurance 
status and a set of socio-economic, demographic and health variables included to reduce the 
likelihood of confounding.  The specific drug insurance status variables we considered varied 
with our target group – for seniors and social assistance recipients, we estimated the price that 
they faced for prescription drugs under their provincial drug plan.  For the general population, 
we used variations in drug insurance coverage status (some vs. none) attributable to their 
occupational status (such as full time student, self employed professional, farmer, technician, 
etc.).  This variable turned out to be a useful predictor of insurance coverage that had the 
desirable statistical feature that it was independent of latent differences in individuals’ need for 
prescription drugs. 
 
We found considerable inter-provincial variation in direct charges for senior beneficiaries of the 
provincial drug plans.  Mean charges ranged from $0 (Ontario 1994-95) to $26.62 
(Saskatchewan 1996-97).  Drug charges for seniors were increasing over time, especially for 
residents of 2 of Canada’s most populous provinces – Ontario and Quebec.  Charges for social 
assistance recipients were much lower – most provinces charged nothing, and those that did 
charge, typically charged $2 per prescription.  A notable exception was the province of Quebec, 
which introduced deductibles and coinsurance rates upwards of $6 per prescription beginning in 
August, 1996. 
 
Our results point to three important determinants of drug insurance coverage among the general 
population 19-64 years of age.  The first is household income, which is not entirely surprising – 
those with higher levels of household income are better able to pay for drug insurance coverage, 
or perhaps are employed in occupations which offer drug insurance benefits.  The likelihood of 
insurance increases monotonically from 40% for those with incomes of $10,000-$19,999 to 80% 
for those with incomes of $60,000 or more.  After controlling for income, however, we 
discovered interesting differences in coverage by occupational categories: 77% of technicians, 
high level management and full time students reported insurance, whereas only 30% of farmers, 
43% of farm labourers and 44% of self-employed professionals did.  The inter-provincial 
differences in drug insurance coverage were also surprising, given the many socio-economic and 
demographic factors that had been controlled for.  Coverage rates were highest in 2 of Canada’s 
richest provinces, Alberta and Ontario (73% each) and lowest in Saskatchewan (44%), Manitoba 
(53%) and British Columbia (60%). 
 
Having established the variations in prescription drug insurance coverage in Canada, our next 
question is: does this make a difference in the use of drugs and physicians services and 
ultimately health status?  The short answer is that, conditional upon the variation in drug prices 
that we could use in our study (about 75% of observations on seniors were removed owing to 
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measurement problems), drug prices do not seem to affect most seniors’ use of drugs and 
physicians services.  Our models of general population suggest the same thing – those with drug 
insurance coverage seem to make about the same use of drugs and doctors as those without 
coverage.  Although this is consistent with the existing body of research evidence, it should be 
noted that the nature of our drug use measure – the number of different prescription drugs taken 
in the last 2 days – is not sensitive to variations in the dosage of the drug taken.  Hence, our 
models cannot assess if drug charges lead seniors to take only a portion of their prescribed 
dosages.  This problem not withstanding, it appears that public drug subsidies have the primary 
effect of shifting the financial cost of drugs from consumers to government – the overall amount 
of drugs taken will not change much for the average consumer. 
 
This is not necessarily true for lower income individuals however.  We found the drug use of 
social assistance recipients to be sensitive to even relatively modest copayments of $0-$6.  
Hence for this group, the removal of all drug charges will likely increase drug use even more.  
These individuals also made slightly fewer physician visits when required to pay more for drugs.  
 
The health status implications of prescription drug subsidies remain somewhat unclear.  Even 
though the NPHS tracks the health status of individuals over time, we were unable isolate the 
effects of cost sharing changes from other time varying factors among those whose prescription 
drug coverage changed between the 1994 and 1996 surveys. We did use several indirect 
methods.  First, we note that for most seniors and general population, drug use is quite 
insensitive to modest changes in drug prices (there is very little evidence on responses to large 
changes in drug costs) hence it is unlikely that health will change as a result.  Those with lower 
incomes, on the other hand, are much more price sensitive and could be adversely affected by 
increases in drug costs.  Second, for seniors and social assistance recipients we estimated 
separate price sensitivities for those with varying levels of gross household income.  We found 
evidence that lower income social assistance recipients were more price responsive than those 
with higher income, but the results for seniors remained inconclusive.  Third, we determined the 
effects of drug charges on the use of potentially needed medications by those with specific 
chronic disorders.  We estimated the effect of variations in direct charges on the use of insulin 
and oral glyceamics among individuals diagnosed with diabetes, anti-hypertensives use among 
those diagnosed with high blood pressure, and asthma medications among individuals with 
asthma.  We found that the probability of drug use was generally independent of drug charges, 
even among social assistance recipients.  Again, an interpretive word of caution is in order – the 
drug use question pertains to whether or not the drug was used at any time during the last 4 
weeks.  Our analysis does not identify variations in medications non-compliance associated with 
drug charges, beyond the simple use vs. non-use of these drugs during at least 1 point in the last 
4 weeks.  Future work will correct this deficiency by examining detailed information on 2 day 
drug use. 
 
Based on the evidence generated in this study, and in combination with evidence from other 
sources we would conclude that for most individuals, expansion of the drug subsidies in the form 
of a national pharmacare program would not have much impact on their drug utilization 
behaviour.  There are important subgroups of low income and sick individuals, however, for 
whom drug prices are a barrier to care and for whom drug subsidies would encourage additional 
drug use, possibly improving their health status.  Finally, we remind that reader that there may be 
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valid reasons for national pharmacare that have not been discussed here.  These may include 
concerns over distributional equity, or a belief that centralizing the purchase of prescription 
drugs will result in lower drug prices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A central theme in the development of the Canadian health care system has been a public 
commitment to remove financial barriers to necessary care.  The Medical Care Act of 1965 and 
the subsequent Canada Health Act of 1984 outline a set of principles that define a national public 
insurance system for “medically necessary” physician and hospital care.  Although out-of-
hospital prescription drugs are not covered under the Canada Health Act, each provincial 
government has established some form of drug insurance program for selected beneficiary 
groups, including seniors (those 65 years and older), individuals receiving social assistance 
income, and those residing in long term care facilities.  The non-Atlantic provinces subsidize 
some of the drug costs of the remainder of the population who incur high drug costs relative to 
income.  Individuals who do not qualify for public coverage have access to private drug 
insurance coverage, although the terms and conditions of coverage vary widely.  Because these 
programs were not established under the Canada Health Act, drug insurers have not been bound 
by national terms and conditions and have taken different approaches to designing benefit 
packages.  Differences between these programs act as a natural experiment that can supply 
important information on the effects of different policy options – information that can add to the 
evidential base for policy making. 
 
The use of prescription drugs has important clinical and economic implications.  Prescription 
drugs are an integral component of medical care and can be among the most effective and cost-
effective forms of care.  Yet, recent studies have suggested that some Canadians do not have 
adequate drug insurance coverage.  To reduce direct charges for prescription drugs, the National 
Forum on Health(1) recommended that the current patchwork quilt of private and public drug 
coverage be replaced by a national pharmacare program, with the same terms and conditions as 
currently exists for medical services, the consequence being that all Canadians should receive 
drugs free of charge.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence pertinent to the formulation of a national 
pharmacare program using data from the National Population Health Surveys (NPHS), which 
were administered to a randomly selected sample of the non- institutionalized population of the 
10 provinces in 1994-95 and again in 1996-97.  We first examine some aspects of the 
comprehensiveness of current prescription drug insurance in Canada.  While this issue has 
recently been addressed elsewhere(2), the NPHS offers some new perspectives on the issue, 
including the levels of cost sharing among seniors (those 65 years and older) and social 
assistance recipients – the 2 primary beneficiary groups of the provincial drug programs, and the 
determinants of prescription drug insurance coverage among the general population – the non 
elderly population (19 – 64 years) not receiving social assistance benefits.   
 
A national pharmacare program, should it be implemented, will alter the prices that some 
individuals pay for prescription drugs.  This may cause intended effects – such as encouraging 
the use of drugs by those who are price sensitive (who may also tend to be lower income and of 
lower health status), but changes in drug prices may also lead to unintended effects.  For 
example, lowering prescription drug prices might induce some to seek additional physician care, 
as access to prescription drugs requires physician consent.  We therefore examine how drug 
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prices – and household income – affect the utilization of prescription drugs (both those used for 
acute and chronic conditions), the use of over the counter drugs and the number of physician 
consultations by individuals.  We assess these effects in three different groups – seniors, social 
assistance recipients and the general population.  Variation in drug charges comes from the 
differences in the generosity of the provincial drug plans.  Finally, we assess how drug charges 
affect the use of specific medicines by groups with specific chronic diseases, i.e. the use of 
insulin and oral glyceamics by individuals diagnosed with diabetes, antihypertensives use by 
those diagnosed with high blood pressure, and asthma medications use by individuals with 
asthma.  Again, similar studies have been reported in the literature.  Nevertheless, it is 
informative to determine if our price elasticity estimates (estimated using up-to-date data on the 
residential population of Canada – who are the intended recipients of a national pharmacare 
program) correspond to those reported in the literature which pertain to different jurisdictions at 
different periods.   
 
2. Methods 
2.1 The 1994-95 and 1996-97 National Population Health Surveys 
Our primary sources of data are the 1994-95 and 1996-97 NPHS.  These were two 
comprehensive cross-sectional surveys of Canadian residents to assess population health status, 
and to ascertain disease risk factors and use of health services.  The target population of the 2 
surveys was all residents of dwellings in the provinces of Canada over the survey period June 
1994 through June 1995, and June 1996 through August 1997.  A total of 26,429 individuals 
were interviewed in the 1994 NPHS and 81,804 in the 1996 NPHS(3).  Residents in Canada’s 
northern territories, Indian reserves, Canadian Forces Bases, institutions and remote areas of 
Ontario and Quebec were excluded.  Details of the NPHS survey frame are found in Appendix 2. 
 
2.2 Measurement of drug use 
The 1994 NPHS collected several sources of information on drug use.  The respondent was first 
asked whether they had taken any of 20 specific types of drugs, or any others not listed, during 
the last month.  The drug use categories were (listed in the order in which they were asked): 
“pain relievers”, “tranquilizers such as valium”, “diet pills”, “anti-depressants”, “Codeine, 
Demerol or Morphine”, “allergy medications such as ‘Sinutab’”, “asthma medications”, “cough 
or cold medications”, “penicillin or other antibiotics”, “medicine for the heart”, “medicine for 
blood pressure”, “diuretics or water pills”, “steroids”, “insulin”, “pills to control diabetes”, 
“sleeping pills”, “stomach remedies”, “laxatives”, “hormones for menopause or aging 
symptoms”, and “birth control pills”.  The 1996 NPHS identified use of the same list of drugs 
and also identified the use of thyroid medications. 
 
Using these data, we constructed three indicator variables of use of “medicine for blood 
pressure”; use of “insulin” or  “pills to control diabetes”; and use of “asthma medications” in the 
past month.  As we explain below, we modeled the use (vs. non-use) of these three medications 
as a function of the drug insurance status of those diagnosed with hypertension, diabetes, and 
asthma, respectively. 
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If the respondent reported taking at least one drug over the last month, s/he was asked how many 
different medications were taken in the last two days.  The interviewer then asked for the exact 
name of each of the medications taken, and, according to the NPHS Interviewer's Manual, was 
required to ask the respondent to look at the bottle, tube or box.  Interviewers were further 
instructed to obtain the medicine’s brand name or generic name and to get as much descriptive 
information (including dosage form and strength) as possible.  The respondent was then asked, 
“do you use other health products such as ointments, vitamins, herbs, etc?”  The names of all 
drugs taken were recorded and subsequently categorized by Statistics Canada using a drug 
classification developed specifically for the NPHS.  The drug code consists of 7 characters and 
distinguishes drugs with different active ingredients; the first 5 characters distinguishes drugs 
with different therapeutic effect but generally used to treat the same health conditions and the 
first 3 characters distinguishes the health condition.  Hence, for example, the 5-character code 
A02BA identifies the H2-receptor antagonists, while the 7 character code identifies the individual 
H2-receptor antagonists such as cimetidine, ranitidine, etc.  The 3-digit code A02 identifies the 
drugs commonly used to treat stomach or intestinal ulcers and includes, the proton pump 
inhibitors, and the antacids in addition to the H2-receptor antagonists.   
 
A pharmacist categorized each 5-character drug code as being available only by prescription or 
available over the counter, and applied this coding to all 7-character drugs sharing the same 5-
character prefix.  Drugs that did not conveniently fall into these 2 categories were classified as 
prescription.  These included over the counter drugs typically prescribed by a physician (e.g. 
insulin, nitrates) and therefore attract a dispensing fee.  These also included drug codes which 
combine prescription and over the counter drugs into the same category; one such example is the 
code which describes “appetite pills/meds, bile pills, digestion pills”.  We then constructed 
measures of the number of different prescription drugs and the number of different over the 
counter drugs, both of which were taken over the last 2 days. 
 
The nature of the NPHS drug use data affected our study objectives.  First, the NPHS recorded 
information on the number and type of drugs used.  We can therefore model how drug charges 
affect the probability of some drug use, and the total number of different drugs taken over the 
last two days, but we were unable to detect changes in the dosage of each drug taken (unless of 
course the respondent discontinues or initiates use of a drug in response to a change in drug 
charges).  One would therefore expect our price elasticity estimates to be smaller (in absolute 
value) than estimates which use a continuous measure of prescription drug use.  Second, because 
information on drug manufacturer was not given we were also unable to detect the impact of 
drug charges affect the choice of use of a brandname or (where they existed) “generic” versions 
of the same active ingredient.  Third, the relatively short survey recall window (two days) means 
that most of the drugs reported would likely be taken on a daily basis.  Drugs taken daily are 
more likely to be prescribed for the management of chronic health conditions, whereas drugs 
taken intermittently are more likely to be prescribed for acute conditions, or conditions for which 
medication is taken on an “as needed” basis.  Given that the financial burden of drug fees 
depends on the prescribed duration of use, we categorized the prescription drugs as being used 
primarily for acute or for chronic use and estimated separate models for each type of prescription 
drug.  Some drugs are used for both chronic and acute conditions – these drugs were treated as 
missing. 
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2.3 Measurement of physician services use 
We constructed a variable indicating the total number of consultations with primary care 
physicians (both general practitioners and family physicians) over the 12-month period prior to 
the survey.  There were two observations of over 300 visits reported in the 1996 NPHS.  We 
truncated the number of visits at 300.  
 
2.4 Categorization of NPHS respondents into target groups. 
We elected to estimate separate models of prescription drug use for seniors, social assistance 
recipients and the general population for several reasons: first, as we discuss below, our ability to 
measure the prescription drug insurance coverage of these groups differed considerably.  Second, 
it is possible that the structure of the models differs between the three groups.  For example, the 
effects of socio-economic and demographic characteristics on drug use by seniors might be 
different than the effects for non-seniors.   
 
Seniors .  Seniors were identified as being 65 to 84 years, inclusive, at the time of the survey.  All 
of the provincial programs that offer separate benefits for the elderly begin to provide such 
benefits at age 65.  We elected to exclude those 85 years and older for several reasons: first recall 
problems may be especially acute for this group.  Second, to be eligible for inclusion in the 
NPHS, these respondents must be healthy enough to institutionalization (and death) and might be 
atypical of other elderly persons.  The figures below (Figure 1 and Figure 2) confirm this for the 
case of prescription drug use – rates of use begin to drop off dramatically at age 85 for both 
males and females. 
 
Figure 1 Mean number of different prescription drugs taken last 2 days, by 5-year age 
groups – Males 
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Figure 2 Mean number of different prescription drugs taken last 2 days, by 5-year age 
groups – Females 
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Social assistance recipients.  Social assistance recipiency status was identified by the questions: 
“Thinking about the total income for all household members, from which of the following 
sources did your household receive any income in the past 12 months?” and “What was the main 
source of income?”  In both questions, a list of income sources was read to the respondent; one 
response option was “provincial or municipal social assistance or welfare”.  Those who identified 
this as their main income source1 and were 19-64 years of age, inclusive, were classified as 
social assistance recipients.  (In all provinces, with the exception of Newfoundland, social 
assistance recipients who turn 65 years and become eligible for the seniors only program are no 
longer eligible for the social assistance drug benefits but become eligible for the seniors drug 
benefits.) 
 
General population.  This category excludes those identified as seniors and social assistance 
recipients.  Further, individuals were between 19-64 years, inclusive, and to minimize drug 
insurance status measurement error, did not receive any provincial or municipal social assistance 
or welfare income over the last 12 months. 
 
                                                 
1 The eligibility for provincial social assistance drug benefits among those who received some provincial 
or municipal social assistance or welfare over the last 12 months, but who did not identify this as their 
main source of income did not receive was unclear.  It is possible that they were eligible for such benefits 
for only a portion of the year and were therefore excluded. 
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2.5 Measurement of the level of drug charges 
The NPHS contained only limited information on prescription drug insurance coverage.  The 
1996 (but not the 1994) NPHS posed the direct question: “Do you have insurance that covers all 
or part of the cost of your prescription medications? (Include any private, government or 
employer-paid plans.)”  It is possible, however, to infer both the eligibility of public drug 
insurance and also the amount of public subsidy given to seniors, social assistance recipients and 
general population respondents on the basis of respondent characteristics (e.g. age, province of 
residence, income) reported in the surveys and provincial drug plan eligibility rules, 
independently of the direct question.  Next, we describe how this information was used to 
estimate the level of prescription drug insurance coverage for all 3 groups. 
 
2.5.1 Measurement of drug insurance coverage for the general population 
The drug insurance coverage status of this group was ascertained by their response to the direct 
question, providing a binary indicator of drug insurance coverage for the 1996 NPHS only.  All 
of the non-Atlantic provinces offer drug subsidies to the general population and we potentially 
could have exploited information on both the eligibility and the generosity of drug insurance for 
this group.  We decided against this, however, because we could not tell which respondents were 
in receipt of public subsidies.  In any event, it is likely that only a small fraction of the general 
population in BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario receive public subsidies as they are 
targeted at households with high drug costs relative to income with no other source of drug 
insurance; further, residents of Manitoba and Ontario have to explicitly enroll in the program.  
The rates of participation in the Alberta and Quebec general population drug plans, on the other 
hand, might be higher due to the more attractive benefits.  Alberta currently charges enrolled 
households a monthly premium (currently between $14.35 to $41.00, depending on household 
size and income) and a 30% copayment (up to a $25 per prescription maximum) with no 
deductibles.   Note that the Alberta program insures not only drugs, but also hospital room 
upgrades, ambulance services and other ancillary services.  In Quebec, annual premiums are 
currently between $0 - $175 (depending on household size and income), there is a 25% 
copayment after a $8.33 monthly deductible and a monthly copayment ceiling of $62.50.  
Further, the Quebec government requires that those without access to sufficiently generous 
private insurance (with a minimum benefit package regulated by the government) enroll in the 
public plan. 
 
Estimation of the effect of prescription drug insurance coverage on drug use requires the use of 
specialized statistical techniques.  Suppose that individuals who expect to use lots of medications 
are more likely to find insurance coverage worthwhile than those who expect to use fewer drugs.  
For high expected users, insurance subsidizes their potentially large expected drug bill (and also 
provides some risk insulation) and it might be worth the cost, especially if the premium is based 
on the average drug expenses of both high and low drug users.  Consider what happens when we 
naïvely compare the drug use of those with and without prescription drug insurance.  We find 
that those with insurance use more drugs than those without, and conclude that drug insurance 
“causes” more drug use, when in fact the correlation is due to individuals with differing levels of 
expected drug use sorting themselves into and out of drug insurance coverage.  Hence we could 
not conclude from our na ïve analysis that insurance coverage will change drug use behaviour, for 
example by inducing those with low expected drug use to consume more drugs.  A common 
 7
solution to similar problems is to use the “instrumental variable” estimator – implementation of 
this estimator requires auxiliary variables which are at once a) correlated with individuals choice 
to hold drug insurance coverage and b) uncorrelated with unobserved differences in individuals’ 
need for drugs.  The coin toss to decide who gets insured in the context of a hypothetical 
randomized controlled trial of the impact of insurance coverage on drug use is an example of a 
valid instrumental variable: it is highly correlated with who receives insurance but is independent 
of drug use.  In the present study, individuals were clearly not randomized in and out of 
insurance coverage.  Insurance coverage is, however, highly correlated with one’s type of 
occupation and enrollment in post-secondary educational institutions, but after controlling for 
respondent health status, occupation and educational group membership is also plausibly 
uncorrelated with expected drug use.  Private insurance coverage is typically provided as a 
benefit of occupational or student group membership, and members are given little opportunity 
to opt out of drug coverage entirely, unless they have drug insurance coverage from some other 
source.  One could argue that individuals with high drug needs would migrate into occupations 
which afford coverage and those with low drug needs would migrate to occupations with no 
coverage.  We would argue that, given our classification of occupations, between occupation 
migration is quite costly and likely to be uncommon.  For individuals who reported working for 
pay or profit and not a full time student in the last 12 months, we categorized their sector of 
occupation using the Pineo classification(3); these categories are: self-employed professionals, 
employed professionals, high level management, semi-professionals, technicians, middle 
management, supervisors, foremen and forewomen, skilled clerical/sales/service, skilled crafts 
and trades, farmers, semi-skilled clerical/sales, semi-skilled manual, unskilled 
clerical/sales/service, unskilled manual, and farm labourers.  Separate categories were created for 
full time students and for those who were not full time students and who did not work for pay or 
profit in the last 12 months.  An individual deciding to migrate between these occupational 
groups to take advantage of improved drug insurance coverage would first face the search costs 
of finding new employment (if going to a new job) and would also perhaps need to upgrade their 
skills to move into a different field (consider, for example, the costs incurred by a farm labourer 
wishing to apply for a high level management position so as to take advantage of the better drug 
coverage available).  Hence we argue that variations in respondents’ educational and labour 
market activity status induce pseudo randomization(4) into insurance coverage, in much the 
same way as the coin toss would explicitly randomize individuals into insurance coverage.   
 
2.5.2 Measurement of drug insurance coverage for seniors  
As we explain in detail below, we ascertained the level of public prescription drug insurance 
coverage for seniors and social assistance recipients on the basis of their reported characteristics 
(e.g. age, province of residence, income) in conjunction with the provincial drug plan eligibility 
rules.  Senior and social assistance recipient respondents who hold private drug insurance would 
also likely respond in the affirmative to the question, but it is difficult to distinguish holders of 
private drug insurance from those who respond positively because they use the public system and 
recognize these public subsidies as prescription drug “insurance”.  Hence there will be some 
over-estimation of drug charges for those who hold private insurance, especially for those 
programs in which patients pay a large percentage of drug costs.  By the same token, this will 
likely not be problematic for social assistance recipients, because they receive reasonably 
comprehensive drug insurance (most paying between $0 - $2 per prescription during the periods 
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covered by the 1994-95 and 1996-97 NPHS) and only a small minority would likely find the 
purchase of private drug insurance worthwhile.  
 
Each provincial government operates its own drug plan for seniors and social assistance 
recipients; each with its own terms and conditions.  The history of these terms and conditions, 
from the program inception dates to August 1999, are described in the companion document 
“Beneficiary cost sharing under Canadian provincial prescription drug benefit programs: History 
and assessment”.  The NPHS contains data with which to assign senior respondents into the 
public drug insurance programs, including respondent age (65 years and older), province of 
residence and date of survey administration (for respondents residing in provinces where the plan 
eligibility and/or cost sharing requirements changed over a survey period).  In addition to these 
criteria, some plans provided more generous benefits to lower income seniors.  The province of 
Saskatchewan offered different benefits to seniors with full, partial and no Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS) benefits, as did Quebec after August 1 1996.  Prior to this, Quebec 
differentiated coverage to seniors on the basis of the receipt of full versus less-than-full GIS.  
The provinces of New Brunswick and Newfoundland, and during the 1994-95 NPHS survey 
period, the province of Nova Scotia differentiated coverage to seniors on the basis of the receipt 
of some versus no GIS.  During the 1996-97 NPHS survey period, Manitoba instituted a drug 
insurance system targeted at seniors and the general population which covered all drug costs in 
excess of an household income specific deductible; this deductible was 2% (3%) of adjusted 
household income for households with adjusted household income of $15,000 or less (more than 
$15,000).  Finally, in July 1996 Ontario introduced an income-contingent copayment for seniors.  
Seniors faced a $100 deductible, and paid a $6.11 per prescription copayment thereafter; seniors 
with low income, defined as household income of less than $16,018 if single and less than 
$24,175 if married or common-law, paid $2 per prescription.   
 
Both household income and GIS recipiency status are recorded in the NPHS, although the 
information provided may in some cases lead to some classification error, for several reasons.  
First, there are the usual problems with recall and respondents’ tendency to strategically under-
report income.  Second, income information in the NPHS is reported in $5,000 intervals for 
household income between $0 - $19,999 and in $10,000 intervals for household income between 
$20,000 - $59,999.  The final 2 intervals are $60,000-$79,999 and $80,000+.  These categories 
did not match the program eligibility criterion for Ontario.  Senior Ontarians eligible for the 
lower copayment plan were identified by reported gross household income of $19,999 or less if 
single, widowed, separated or divorced, (the threshold level is an adjusted income of $16,018) 
and by gross household income of $29,999 or less if married, common-law or living with a 
partner (the threshold level is an adjusted income of $24,175).  Manitobans eligible for the lower 
deductible plan were identified by reported gross household income of $14,999 or less.  GIS 
recipiency status was identified by the questions: “Thinking about the total income for all 
household members, from which of the following sources did your household receive any 
income in the past 12 months?” and “What was the main source of income?”  For both questions, 
a list of income sources was read to the respondent; one response option was “Old Age Security 
and Guaranteed Income Supplement”.  If the respondent identified OAS and GIS as the main 
income source, individuals were assumed to have received the maximum GIS benefit.  
Individuals who identified OAS and GIS as an income source, but not their main income source, 
were assumed to have received a partial GIS benefit.  Finally, individuals for whom OAS and 
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GIS was not an income source were assumed to have not received any GIS benefits.  (No 
respondents identified OAS and GIS as their main income source, but did not identify OAS and 
GIS as an income source.)  Although respondents are likely to be more candid in their responses 
to GIS status than to their household income, it is possible that some respondents may have 
misinterpreted the response category “Old Age Security and GIS” as “Old Age Security or GIS”. 
 
Having identified seniors program eligibility, we next turn to the identification of the level of 
cost sharing within each program.  The structure of the cost sharing arrangements can be 
characterized along 2 dimensions: 1) does the beneficiary pay the same amount for each 
prescription, or does the price paid vary with the number of prescriptions filled?  and 2) does the 
amount paid per prescription depend on the cost of the prescription or is it independent of drug 
cost; if the former is true, does the cost depend on the dispensing fee component, the drug 
ingredient cost, or both?  Each of these dimensions has implications for our methodology.   
 
First, if the drug plan invokes a deductible or payment ceiling, the amount paid for each 
prescription will (eventually) decline with the number of prescriptions dispensed.  For example, 
BC seniors currently pay their dispensing fee up to a $200 annual maximum.  If the dispensing 
fee is $8, then the first 25 prescriptions carry an $8 charge, but any additional prescriptions are 
free of charge.  Consider what happens when we attempt to use this price variation ($0 or $8 per 
prescription) to estimate the effect of drug price on drug use.  Suppose that there is no correlation 
between drug use and price: individuals are completely insensitive to the price of drugs and will 
pay virtually any price (up to their incomes).  If this is the case, it seems plausible that 
individuals who have a large medical need for drugs will pay $0 for their next drug, whereas 
those with low needs will pay $8 per prescription.  But this will generate a negative correlation 
between drug price and use, leading to the erroneous conclusion that drug use is price sensitive.  
There are several potential solutions to this problem. The first is to add health status and other 
variables to the model to explain whether the individual is a high or low drug user.  But if this is 
not adequately modeled, there will be residual correlation between the drug price and 
unexplained drug needs which will contaminate estimates.  Second, adopt the “instrumental 
variable” estimator – implementation of this estimator requires variables which are at once a) 
correlated with individuals choice to consume above or below the threshold at which the price of 
drugs changes (25 prescriptions in the example above) and b) uncorrelated with unobserved 
differences in individuals’ need for drugs.  Unfortunately, we could find no variables with these 
properties in the NPHS.   
 
The measurement of marginal drug cost (MDC) – the cost of the next drug dispensed – for 
respondents who face deductibles or payment ceilings creates another difficulty.  The NPHS 
records the number of different prescription drugs taken over the last 2 days, whereas in order to 
determine if the patient has exceeded the threshold number of prescriptions, we require data on 
the number of prescriptions filled from the start of the deductible accounting period to the survey 
date.  For example, we need to infer whether a senior respondent from BC has filled at least 25 
prescriptions and would therefore receive drugs free of charge solely on the basis of 2 day drug 
use.  We attempted to measure this by dividing estimates of BC seniors respondents’ number of 
drugs taken per day (add) by average number of days supply per prescription (ads)(5), to arrive 
at an estimate of the average number of prescriptions filled daily.  For example, a senior taking 2 
drugs per day where each prescription lasts 1 month will fill an average of 2/30 prescriptions per 
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day and will fill an average of 2/30*365 or about 24 prescriptions per year.  We multiplied the 
average daily prescription fill rate times the number of days that had elapsed between the start of 
the deductible accounting period (deddate) and the survey interview date (intdate) to estimate the 
number of prescriptions filled at the time of the survey (1+intdate-deddate) and then multiplied 
this by the average dispensing fee (adf) to determine if the respondent had exceeded the $200 
threshold.  Hence the MDC for a BC senior was $0 if (adf)*(add/ads)*(1+intdate-deddate)>$200 
and $adf otherwise.  In order to estimate the number of drugs taken per day (add), we could have 
used respondents’ reports of 2 day prescription drug use, but in other to avoid using responses 
which were temporarily large or small, we first estimated the average number of prescription 
drugs taken for each level of health status (measured by the number of different chronic health 
problems) among Canadian seniors and used the average corresponding to each respondent’s 
health status.  The same general approach was used to estimate drug charges for seniors enrolled 
in programs with other forms of non- linear drug prices. 
 
Another problem arises when the drug charge is not known with certainty.  The simplest case is 
when the charge is the same amount for all seniors and is known with certainty.  Such was the 
case when Ontario provided drugs free of charge to all seniors, or when Quebec charged a $2 per 
prescription to those seniors not receiving the maximum GIS benefit.  The next simplest case is 
when the copayment is some fraction of the dispensing fee, as is currently the case for BC 
seniors.  Although there are some variations in dispensing fees charged, competitive pressures in 
retail pharmacy typically minimize the variance in dispensing fees charged seniors in a province.  
We used province-specific average dispensing fees charged for seniors; these data are collected 
and assembled by the Canadian Pharmacists Association(6).  The most complex case is when the 
drug charge includes some fraction of the drug ingredient cost – there is great heterogeneity in 
the per-unit prices and quantities of prescription drugs dispensed which translates into large 
differences in drug charges.  Such is the case for drug charges in Manitoba – seniors whose 
cumulative expenditures are below the deductible amount face the full cost of the prescription.  
We used province-specific average total drug cost(6) to estimate MDC for those provinces.   
 
Clearly, the precision of the estimates of drug charges for seniors varies widely depending on the 
terms and conditions of the provincial drug insurance plan.  Measurement error in the drug 
charges can adversely affect the statistical properties of our estimators.  Moreover, as we have 
explained, our price elasticity estimates using data from those plans in which the MDC varied 
with the number of prescriptions dispensed are likely to be misleading.  In recognition of this, we 
categorized senior respondents into levels reflecting the reliability of both the assignment of 
seniors into provincial drug insurance plans and the estimation of the level of cost sharing within 
each plan, and then restricted our sample to those observations for which we had a reasonable 
degree of confidence in our estimate of drug charges.  Drug charge estimation reliability was 
determined by 1) whether eligibility depends on reported income or GIS status; 2) whether MDC 
depended on cumulative drug use and 3) whether the drug charge is known, some fraction of 
dispensing fee, or some fraction of the cost of the drug.  This created 2´2´3=12 different 
categories which were assigned into 4 levels of overall reliability; these are illustrated in Table 
1, below.  For the purposes of estimating models of the effect of prescription drug charges on 
drug use for seniors, we elected to restrict the sample of observations to those for which the 
overall reliability was either “very good” or “good”.  These observations had a MDC which was 
either known with certainty or a fraction of dispensing fee, and which did not vary with 
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cumulative (deductible year-to-date) drug consumption.  One exception was made for the drug 
plan in Quebec.  Prior to August 1996, seniors not receiving the maximum GIS subsidy faced a 
$2 per prescription charge subject to a $100 annual ceiling.  We assumed that most Quebec 
seniors would have filled less than 50 prescriptions between the start of the deductible period and 
the interview date and hence assigned a MDC of $2 for these subjects, categorized their overall 
MDC reliability as “good” and included these observations in the estimation sample. 
Table 1  Assignment of respondents into categories of overall marginal drug cost estimate reliability 
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2.5.3 Measurement of drug insurance coverage for social assistance recipients  
 
Fortunately, many of the problems that hamper estimation of drug charges for seniors are 
generally not present for social assistance recipients.  First, as was mentioned, social assistance 
recipients are less likely to have private drug coverage, thereby reducing the potential for 
measurement error.  Second, in most cases, drug cost is some fixed amount per prescription, and 
does not vary with the number of prescriptions.  There were some exceptions.  First, starting in 
November 1997, Alberta charged social assistance recipients $2 for the first three prescriptions 
per month, and $0 thereafter.  We assumed that all prescriptions attracted the $2 charge.  Second, 
between August to December 1996, the province of Quebec required social assistance recipients 
to pay a 25% copayment to a maximum of $83.33 for the 5-month period.  (Previously drugs 
were provided free of charge.)  In addition to the 25% copayment, a $25 quarterly deductible was 
imposed and a quarterly maximum of $50 added between January to June 1997.  Starting in July 
1997, the quarterly deductible and maximum were replaced by a monthly $8.33 deductible and 
$16.67 maximum.  We ignored the issues associated with the introduction of deductibles and 
assumed that a drug charge of $6.18 (25% of the average Quebec drug program drug cost of 
$24.72) applied to all prescriptions.  Third, beginning in April 1996, New Brunswick imposed a 
maximum beneficiary contribution of $250 per household.  The per-prescription charge was $4 
for adults and $2 for children under 18; a household had to fill over 62 prescriptions for adults or 
125 prescriptions for children to exceed their maximum.  Given these very high rates of drug use, 
we assumed that no households exceeded the payment maximum.  Fourth, in Nova Scotia 
responsibility for the drug benefits program for social assistance recipients was transferred from 
the municipal government to the provincial government in April 1996.  The several municipal 
governments that we contacted did not charge for prescription drugs and we assumed that this 
applied to all municipal governments.  It is possible that this introduced some measurement 
error. 
 
2.5.4 The effects of drug formularies on drug cost estimates. 
Drug charges can be applied to all drugs generally, or can be applied to specific drugs.  For 
example, most provinces restrict reimbursement to a list of drugs contained in a formulary.  This 
amounts to a 100% co- insurance on off- formulary drugs and is another source of inter-provincial 
variation in drug coverage.  We do not exploit between provincial and intertemporal variations in 
drug formularies and it is important to consider what impact this will have on our research 
questions.  If these non-reimbursed drugs are not commonly prescribed then the effect on the 
number of drugs taken should be negligible (subsumed in the random disturbance of the 
estimating equations).  Even if the drugs are commonly prescribed, however, the impact on 
number of drugs taken might be small.  Formularies typically do not exclude entire classes of 
drugs with similar therapeutic effect; they might, however, selectively exclude particular dosage 
forms of drugs.  If there are other drugs available with similar therapeutic effect, then these 
restrictions should not change the number of drugs taken - just the mix.   
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2.6 Measurement of health status 
Health status is typically an important predictor in empirical models of health care utilization.  
As Manning et al(7) note in their review of the literature, health status often explains most of the 
variance in regression models of medical care utilization.  More importantly, controlling for it 
can affect the magnitude of other estimated coefficients because of the correlations between 
health status and other regressors such as education, income and age. 
 
We used two measures of overall health status, one based on self-perception of overall health 
status, the other based on medical diagnoses of chronic conditions.  The level of self-assessed 
overall health status was ascertained with the following question: “In general, how would you 
describe your health: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?”  This measure of overall health 
has been shown to correlate well with physician assessments, measures of functional 
ability/disability, number and/or type of self-reported health problems, diagnoses or chronic 
diseases, acute symptoms and  composite measures of health status based on either self reports or 
a combination of physician and self- reported conditions and health service utilization data(8-10).   
 
In addition, we constructed a variable indicating the number of different chronic health problems 
which had been diagnosed by a medical professional.  The 1994 NPHS identified the following 
20 conditions: food allergies, other allergies, asthma, arthritis/rheumatism, non-arthritis back 
problems, high blood pressure, migraine headaches, chronic bronchitis/emphysema, sinusitis, 
diabetes, epilepsy, heart disease, cancer, stomach/intestinal ulcers, effects of stroke, urinary 
incontinence, Alzheimer’s disease, cataracts, glaucoma, or other long term condition.  In addition 
to these conditions, the 1996 NPHS identified those with thyroid conditions and those with a 
“bowel disorder such as Crohn’s Disease or colitis”. 
 
2.7 Measurement of socio-economic and demographic characteristics  
Six indicator variables of gross household income earned in the 12 months prior to the survey 
were constructed and used in models for seniors and the general population: $0-$9,999 (the 
reference category); $10,000-$19,999; $20,000-$29,999; $30,000-$39,999; $40,000-$59,999; 
$60,000 and over.  Models for social assistance recipients used just 4 categories: $0-$9,999; 
$10,000-$19,999; $20,000-$29,999; $30,000 and over.  In every model, the logarithm of 
household size was included to deflate income into per capita terms.  One of the study objectives 
is to assess if the effects of drug charges vary by individuals’ household income level.  This was 
accomplished by interacting the drug charge variable with the income indicator variables.  We 
also included an indicator of whether or not the respondent’s dwelling was owned by a 
household member to measure wealth.  In a previous study of prescription drug use using the 
1994 NPHS(11), we merged community- level socio-economic status from the 1991 Statistics 
Canada census to the federal electoral district (FED) in which the respondent resided.  These 
included information on FED-level unemployment rate (among those 15 years and older); the 
FED-level median household income and the FED-level mean home ownership rate.  These 
variables were found to have negligible effects on drug use and hence were not used here. 
 
A variety of additional variables were included in the statistical models to reduce the likelihood 
of confounding.  The effects of changes in these variables on drug utilization are not of primary 
interest here because the modelling technique used can only identify the “overall” effect.  For 
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example, higher levels of educational attainment might be associated with lower drug use due to 
“healthy” lifestyle choices not controlled for by the health status variables.  On the other hand, 
individuals with higher levels of education might consume more drugs due to a heightened 
awareness of advances in pharmacotherapy. 
 
The effect of gender on drug use was captured using an indicator variable equal to one if the 
respondent is male.  For models of social assistance recipients and the general population, 6 age 
categories were included: 19-24 years inclusive (the reference category), 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 
50-59, and 60-64. Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggest that the lifecycle patterns of drug use differ by 
sex, especially for individuals under age 65.  To accommodate this, we added sex-age group 
interaction variables to the models.  For models of seniors’ drug use, 4 five-year age categories 
were constructed: 65-69 (the reference category), 70-74, 75-79, and 80-84.  We did not include 
sex-age group interaction variables for seniors.  Three marital status indicator variables were 
constructed: never married (the reference category); married, common-law, or living with a 
partner; and widowed, separated, or divorced.  Four indicator variables denoting the highest level 
of educational attainment were constructed: less than secondary level education (the reference 
category); secondary level education; beyond secondary level education; and college or 
university degree.   
 
2.8 Measurement of access to drug prescribers  
One factor possibly influencing prescription drug use is access to drug prescribers.  In a previous 
study of prescription drug use using the 1994 NPHS(11), we controlled for variations in 
prescriber access by merging FED-level 1994 physician full time equivalents (FTEs) for both 
general practitioners/family physicians and specialists to the FED of the respondent.  (Physician 
supply data were obtained from the Southam Medical Database administered by the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information(12).)  Then, using population estimates from the 1991 Statistics 
Canada census, we computed physician FTEs per 1,000 population in the FED.  These variables 
were found to have virtually no impact on drug use and hence were not used here. 
 
2.9 Estimation Methods 
Table 2 lists the 10 outcome variables under investigation.  Our choice of estimation technique 
depended on the nature of these variables.  Outcome variables 2-7 are non-negative integers 
(count data), and the remainder are binary (0,1).  We elected to use negative binomial regression 
for the count variables and logit regression for the binary outcomes for the models of seniors and 
social assistance recipients.  Negative binomial regression is preferable to the more commonly 
used linear regression estimator on statistical grounds because linear regression is less efficient, 
admits the possibility of negative predicted drug use, and will almost certainly face the problem 
of heteroskedastic errors, invalidating conventional inferential procedures.   
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Table 2  Outcome variables to be modeled 
 
 Outcome variable Target Groups 
1 Number of prescription drugs taken during the last 2 
days 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population 
2 Probability of at least 1 prescription drug taken during 
the last 2 days 
Seniors, social assistance 
3 Number of prescription drugs taken during the last 2 
days, in subsample of those taking at least 1 
prescription drug 
Seniors, social assistance 
4 Number of prescription drugs taken for acute conditions 
during the last 2 days 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population 
5 Number of prescription drugs taken for chronic 
conditions during the last 2 days 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population 
6 Number of over the counter drugs taken during the last 
2 days 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population 
7 Number of physician visits during the last 12 months Seniors, social assistance, general 
population 
8 Probability of use of “insulin” or “pills for diabetes” 
during the last month 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population diagnosed with diabetes 
9 Probability of use of “asthma medications” during the 
last month 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population diagnosed with asthma 
10 Probability of use of “medicine for blood pressure” 
during the last month 
Seniors, social assistance, general 
population diagnosed with 
hypertension 
 
We estimated models of the number of prescription drugs taken during the last 2 days in two 
ways.  First, we used the conventional negative binomial estimator using the entire sample of 
drug users and non-users (model 1).  The parameter estimates from this model indicate the effect 
of changes in drug charges (or drug insurance coverage for the general population sample) on 
average drug use over the population.  Note, however, that the equation for average drug use in 
the population conditional on drug charges and other variables, E(yi | xi) (where yi is the number 
of drugs taken by the ith respondent, and xi are the values of the drug charge and other variables 
for the ith respondent), can be decomposed into the product of the probability of use being 
greater than zero, Pr(yi>0 | xi), and the expected number of drugs used in the subsample of drug 
users, E(yi | yi>0, xi), that is: 
 
E(yi | xi) = Pr(yi>0 | xi) E(yi | yi>0, xi) 
 
Examining the separate effect of drug charges on the probability of some drug use (vs. no use) 
(model 2) and the number of drugs taken by drug users (model 3) offers some additional insights 
into the effects of cost sharing.  If drug use is price sensitive, these models shed some light on 
whether the primary effect of drug charges is to encourage or discourage the use of drugs (vs. no 
drugs) or whether changes in drug use operate through changes in the number of drugs taken by 
users.  If changes in drug use operate through the decision to use pharmaco-therapy or not, then 
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policies which lower drug prices might have implications for individuals’ propensity to seek 
physician care, assuming that the decision to use drugs is associated with the individuals’ 
propensity to seek physician care.  We will directly examine the inter-sectoral implications of 
public drug subsidies using our models of primary care consultations, but the information 
gathered here might provide confirmatory evidence. 
 
The regression estimators were modified to account for the cluster sampling frame of the NPHS 
using the robust covariance matrix estimators programmed in STATA version 6.0(13).  In contrast 
to the conventional estimators that assume that all observations are independent within clusters, 
the robust estimators take into account the loss of effective sample size owing to the correlation 
between latent differences in drug and physicians’ services use of survey respondents residing 
within the same clusters.  The greater the degree of correlation, the less information gained per 
cluster and the lower is the precision of the estimates.  Upon preliminary testing, however, the 
robust and conventional standard error estimates were very close.  This perhaps reflects the 
distribution of respondents across clusters; the average number of observations per cluster in the 
seniors, social assistance recipients and general population samples was 1.6, 1.2 and 1.4, 
respectively.  Hence there is not a large loss in effective observations within clusters owing to 
the fact that there were only a few in each to begin with.  In what follows, we use the 
conventional maximum likelihood estimators of the standard errors in the models for seniors and 
social assistance recipients. 
 
After model estimation, we had to transform our estimated coefficients to produce quantities of 
interest.  In the models of the number of different drugs or number of general practitioner 
consultations by seniors and social assistance recipients, we estimated price elasticities, defined 
as the percentage change in use associated with a 1% increase in drug prices.  In the case of the 
general population, we observed only the difference in drug use between those with and those 
without some prescription drug insurance, and estimated the percentage increase in drug use or 
general practitioner visits associated with some versus no drug insurance.  For models of binary 
outcomes, for example, the models of insulin or oral glyceamics use, we estimated the absolute 
change in the probability of drug use associated with either a percentage increase in MDC 
(seniors and social assistance recipients) or between those with and those without some 
prescription drug insurance (general population).  Some of the calculations required that we 
quantify the values of the model covariates  (such as age, sex, marital status, etc.); in these cases, 
we set the covariate values at their estimation sample means.  
 
Once models were estimated, we used a simulation technique developed by King et al (14;15) to 
convey the precision of our estimates.  The approach uses conventional 95% confidence intervals 
around the estimated effects, but builds in uncertainty regarding both parameter estimation 
(which is what most analysts do), but it also reflects “fundamental uncertainty” – that is 
randomness in drug use that cannot be explained by our statistical models.  For this reason, our 
confidence intervals are slightly larger than would be the case had we only considered the former 
type of uncertainty. 
 
We used a different procedure to quantify precision in the models of the impact of drug 
insurance coverage on the drug and physician service use among the general population.  Recall 
that general population respondents who decided to hold drug insurance might also be the ones 
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who have a greater need for drugs in the first place; this created statistical problems that are 
potentially ameliorated by the use of the instrumental variables (IV) estimator.  Because of 
difficulties in operationalizing the IV estimator using count data, we opted to use the standard IV 
estimator for continuous data.  We were reluctant to use the standard IV estimator of the standard 
errors, however, because we suspected the error distribution to be heteroskedastic.  We therefore 
created estimates of the standard errors using the empirical distribution of 1,000 bootstrap 
replications from each of the models. 
 
3. Detailed Results 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables of descriptive statistics for each of the three target groups, and for the entire sample 
(including those in the NPHS who were excluded from the target groups) are presented in 
Appendices 6-9.  Below (Figure 3 - Figure 8) we present histograms of the primary outcome 
variables for each of the three target groups. 
 
 
Figure 3 Histogram of number of different drugs taken in the last 2 days: seniors, social 
assistance recipients and the general population 
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Figure 4 Histogram of number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 days: 
seniors, social assistance recipients and the general population 
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Figure 5 Histogram of number of different prescription drugs for acute conditions taken in 
the last 2 days: seniors, social assistance recipients and the general population 
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Figure 6 Histogram of number of different prescription drugs for chronic conditions taken 
in the last 2 days: seniors, social assistance recipients and the general population 
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Figure 7 Histogram of number of different over the counter drugs taken in the last 2 days: 
seniors, social assistance recipients and the general population 
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Figure 8 Histogram of number of general practitioner consultations in the last 12 months: 
seniors, social assistance recipients and the general population 
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3.2 Probability and comprehensiveness of prescription drug insurance coverage  
3.2.1 Distribution of marginal drug charges for seniors and social assistance recipients 
There was substantial inter-provincial variation in average drug charges for seniors (Table 3).  
The highest mean drug charges during the 1994-95 and 1996-97 NPHS sample periods were 
observed in Saskatchewan ($26.62 per prescription in 1996-97), Manitoba and Prince Edward 
Island; the lowest were observed in Ontario ($0 in 1994-95), Quebec and BC.  Drug charges for 
seniors in Ontario, Quebec and to a lesser extent, Newfoundland, increased between the 2 survey 
periods.  The reader is reminded that these charges are what a senior would pay for an additional 
prescription drug.  In those provinces with deductibles and payment ceilings, the average drug 
charge includes those who (we estimated had) exceeded their deductible or ceiling and would be 
paying a price lower than what they were charged for “below deductible” prescriptions.  The 
frequency distribution of drug charges, which displays the range of drug charges observed during 
each survey period, is presented in Appendix 3.  The reader is also reminded that some provinces 
changed cost sharing rules within a survey period so that drug charges within a province can vary 
depending on the dates respondents were surveyed. 
 
Drug charges for social assistance recipients were generally lower than those charged seniors.  
During the 1994-95 NPHS survey period only 2 provinces – Saskatchewan and New Brunswick 
–charged social assistance recipients for prescription drugs, but during the following survey 3 
other provinces began to charge.  The largest increase was observed in Quebec; prior to the 
reform of its drug insurance system, social assistance recipients received drugs free of charge.  
After the reforms which commenced in August 1996, average drug charges were $6.18.  (Note 
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that the 1996-97 average charge of $4.81 includes drug charges of respondents interviewed prior 
to the introduction of cost sharing.)  
 
Table 3 Estimates of mean marginal drug costs (MDC),  standard deviation, and 
population by provinces 
 
Seniors  
1994-95 NPHS 1996-97 NPHS 
Province 
Mean MDC Std Dev.  Population  Mean MDC Std Dev.  Population  
NF 7.32 3.98          53,119 11.43 4.44          51,663 
PEI 14.85 0.00          15,066 14.45 0.00          14,735 
NS 5.95 1.52        103,188 6.18 1.86        107,067 
NB 6.55 1.81          82,537 8.77 1.56          84,844 
PQ 1.24 0.97        706,784 4.65 2.48        713,264 
ON 0.00 0.00 1,162,881 4.50 7.68        836,849 
MB 24.85 8.15        130,644 25.56 11.20        107,624 
SK 25.65 2.74        124,531 26.62 2.68        124,612 
AB 9.68 1.50        233,419 10.05 0.20        239,672 
BC 6.07 0.71        399,865 5.99 0.00        423,583 
Total 4.57 7.36 3,012,034 7.51 7.89 2,703,913 
Social assistance recipients 
1994-95 NPHS 1996-97 NPHS 
Province 
Mean MDC Std Dev. Population Mean MDC Std Dev. Population 
NF 0.00 0.00          23,166 0.00 0.00          29,837 
PEI 0.00 0.00            2,648 0.00 0.00            1,729 
NS 0.00 0.00          33,800 3.00 0.00          31,654 
NB 2.00 0.00          20,427 4.00 0.00          26,006 
PQ 0.00 0.00        319,209 4.81 2.57        273,278 
ON 0.00 0.00        367,599 1.95 0.31        221,202 
MB 0.00 0.00          26,435 0.00 0.00          21,467 
SK 2.00 0.00          30,808 2.00 0.00          23,193 
AB 0.00 0.00          31,003 0.00 0.00          23,731 
BC 0.00 0.00          91,822 0.00 0.00          80,418 
Total 0.11 0.45        946,917 2.72 2.44        732,515 
 
Note: sampling weights used to make averages representative of population. 
 
3.3 Probability of drug insurance in general population  
There were substantial socio-economic and demographic differences in the probability of drug 
insurance coverage among the general population 19-64 years not receiving social assistance 
(Table 4 and Figure 9); estimates from the logit model are presented in Appendix 5.  Our 
estimates suggest that gross annual household income is the strongest predictor of the probability 
of drug insurance coverage among the different factors considered.  The likelihood of insurance 
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increases monotonically from 40% for those with incomes of $10,000-$19,999 to 80% for those 
with incomes of $60,000 or more.2  After conditioning on income, household wealth (as 
measured by home ownership) increased the probability of drug insurance by only 3%.  
Occupational categories also had strong effects on insurance coverage probabilities: 77% of 
technicians, high level management and full time students reported insurance, whereas only 30% 
of farmers, 43% of farm labourers and 44% of self-employed professionals did.  After 
controlling for income and occupational categories, the only discernable effect of education was 
observed between those who had and had not graduated from highschool, the former having 
about a 5% higher probability of insurance coverage.  Males and females had very similar 
probabilities of coverage, as did individuals between 30-64 years.  Individuals between 19-29 
years were about 3% less likely to report coverage compared to those 30 and older.  The strength 
of marital/partnership bonds impacted on the probability of drug insurance coverage.  Sixty 
percent of those who never married have coverage, compared to 67% of those widowed, 
separated or divorced and 72% of those married, common-law or living with a partner.  
Coverage rates were quite similar between individuals with different levels of self-assessed 
overall health status.  Larger differences were observed between those with varying numbers of 
diagnosed chronic health problems: 65% of those with no chronic health problems had coverage 
whereas 92% of those with 11 or more problems had coverage.  It is possible that individuals 
with several chronic health problems are more likely to be eligible for drug or disease-specific 
coverage offered by their provinc ial government drug plan.  Note, however, that the confidence 
interval around the estimates are larger as the number of health conditions increases, owing to 
the small number of individuals in these groups.  The interprovincial differences in drug 
insurance coverage were surprising, given the many socio-economic and demographic factors 
that had been controlled for.  Coverage rates were highest in 2 of Canada’s richest provinces, 
Alberta and Ontario (73%) and lowest in Saskatchewan (44%), Manitoba (53%) and BC (60%). 
 
Table 4 Estimated probability (with standard errors and 95% confidence intervals) of drug 
insurance coverage by subject age, sex, marital status, household income, homeownership 
status, education, occupation, health status and province of residence.   
 
Age Group Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval 
19-24 0.665 0.010 0.646 0.683
25-29 0.656 0.008 0.640 0.671
30-39 0.700 0.005 0.691 0.709
40-49 0.692 0.005 0.681 0.702
50-59 0.691 0.007 0.678 0.704
60-64 0.691 0.010 0.671 0.711
Sex Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval 
Male 0.683 0.004 0.675 0.691
Female 0.692 0.004 0.684 0.699
Marital Status  Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval 
Married/Commonlaw 0.718 0.003 0.711 0.725
                                                 
2 To calculate probabilities of drug insurance coverage by income, we compared the model predictions by 
level of household income, in each case setting the values of the remaining covariates such as age, sex, 
etc at their sample means.  We used the same approach for all of the comparisons reported here. 
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Widowed/Separated/Divorced 0.668 0.008 0.652 0.684
Never Married 0.604 0.007 0.590 0.617
Household Income Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.410 0.016 0.381 0.441
$10,000-19,999 0.399 0.009 0.382 0.416
$20,000-29,999 0.527 0.008 0.513 0.542
$30,000-39,999 0.650 0.006 0.638 0.663
$40,000-59,999 0.760 0.004 0.752 0.768
$60,000+ 0.803 0.004 0.795 0.812
Homeownership status  Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval
Homeowner 0.695 0.003 0.689 0.701
Non-Homeowner 0.665 0.006 0.654 0.676
Education Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval
College/Univ.Degree 0.694 0.004 0.686 0.703
Some Post Secondary 0.691 0.005 0.680 0.701
Highschool Grad 0.700 0.006 0.688 0.711
Less than Highschool 0.650 0.007 0.637 0.663
Occupation Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval
full time student 0.768 0.010 0.747 0.788
not working for pay or profit 0.656 0.007 0.641 0.669
self-employed professional 0.441 0.030 0.383 0.502
employed professional 0.764 0.009 0.745 0.782
high level management 0.766 0.015 0.735 0.795
semi-professional 0.713 0.010 0.694 0.732
technician 0.770 0.018 0.733 0.803
middle management 0.711 0.009 0.693 0.729
supervisor 0.618 0.019 0.581 0.655
foreman 0.660 0.018 0.623 0.695
skilled clerical/sales/service 0.707 0.011 0.685 0.727
skilled crafts/trades 0.693 0.010 0.674 0.711
farmer 0.300 0.019 0.264 0.337
semi-skilled 
clerical/sales/service 0.670 0.008 0.653 0.686
semi-skilled manual 0.695 0.010 0.676 0.714
un-skilled clerical/sales/service 0.714 0.010 0.693 0.734
unskilled manual 0.661 0.009 0.643 0.680
farm labourer 0.432 0.025 0.384 0.482
Self assessed health status  Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval
excellent 0.678 0.005 0.668 0.688
very good 0.690 0.004 0.682 0.698
good 0.687 0.005 0.677 0.697
fair 0.699 0.010 0.679 0.719
poor 0.717 0.018 0.680 0.751
# chronic health problems  Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval
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0 0.658 0.004 0.650 0.666
1 0.692 0.005 0.682 0.701
2 0.712 0.007 0.699 0.724
3 0.718 0.009 0.700 0.736
4 0.726 0.012 0.701 0.750
5 0.765 0.017 0.731 0.796
6-10 0.786 0.017 0.752 0.818
11+ 0.915 0.086 0.668 0.993
Province of residence Mean Probability Standard Error 95% Conf. Interval
BC 0.594 0.018 0.559 0.629
Alberta 0.725 0.005 0.714 0.735
Saskatchewan 0.440 0.024 0.395 0.487
Manitoba 0.532 0.007 0.519 0.545
Ontario 0.730 0.003 0.723 0.736
Quebec 0.668 0.013 0.643 0.693
New Brunswick 0.684 0.020 0.644 0.722
Nova Scotia 0.707 0.020 0.665 0.745
Prince Edward Island 0.698 0.021 0.656 0.738
Newfoundland 0.646 0.022 0.601 0.688
Data source: 1996-97 NPHS 
 
 
Figure 9 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by age groups 
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Figure 10 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by sex.   
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Figure 11 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by marital status 
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Figure 12 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by gross annual household income over previous year 
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Figure 13 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by homeownership status.   
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Figure 14 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by highest level of education. 
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Figure 15 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by occupation. 
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Note: c/s/s = clerical, sales or service. 
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Figure 16 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by self-assessed health status.   
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Figure 17 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by number of chronic health problems.   
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Figure 18 Estimated probability of drug insurance coverage among the general population, 
by province of residence 
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3.4 Effects of drug charges on drug use and physician services use  
3.4.1 Effects of drug charges and income on seniors’ use of drugs and physician 
services  
 
After restricting the seniors sample to those subjects for whom the overall MDC reliability was 
either “very good” or “good”, we were left with 3,195 or 25% of the 12,680 observations on 
seniors in the two NPHS surveys.  These included observations on seniors residing in the 
provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland; the 
distribution of senior’s drug plans into levels of overall MDC estimation reliability are presented 
in Appendix 3.  The average MDC in our estimating sample was $7.11 with a range of $0 to 
$35.89.  Most of the subjects faced a MDC of under $10.00; the most frequently observed MDC 
was $0 (Figure 19).  This corresponds to the observations in Ontario prior to the introduction of 
cost sharing there in July 1996.   
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Figure 19 Frequency distribution of marginal drug cost for seniors in the estimation 
sample. 
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Our results indicate that, in general, seniors’ drug use is rather price insensitive.  Indeed, our 
estimates detect a small positive elasticity of 0.043, meaning that a 1% increase in MDC 
increases the number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 days by 0.043% (95% CI: 
0.011% to 0.073%).  Decomposing the change in drug use, we see that the increase is primarily 
due to increases in the probability of using some (vs. no) drugs: a 1% increase in MDC increases 
the probability of some drug use by about 3 percentage points (95% CI: 1.2% to 4.1%), while 
there were virtually no changes observed in the number of different drugs taken by existing drug 
users.  The overall elasticity of 0.043 could mask difference in the price sensitivity of seniors 
with differing levels of gross annual household income.  But, after accommodating this 
possibility in our models, we did not find any differences in elasticities by income.  Our models 
did reveal, however, differences in the elasticity estimates of models of the number of drugs 
taken for chronic conditions vis-à-vis the models of drug use for acute conditions.  In neither 
case did the results conform with our prior hypotheses – both elasticities were positive, not 
negative, and the absolute size of the elasticity was higher in the models of acute drug use.  
There was virtually no impact of drug charges on the use of over the counter medicines, nor on 
the number of primary care physician visits made over the previous year.  After decomposing the 
impact of price changes on the number of physician visits, we found that a 1% increase in MDC 
was associated with a very small (1%) increase in the probability of consulting a primary care 
physician but that there was virtually no impact on the number of visits made by those who had 
already consulted with physicians in the previous year.  
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Table 5 Estimates of means elasticity by outcome variables, with 95% confidence interval, 
subsample of seniors.  
 
Outcome Variable Mean 
Elasticity 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days 
0.043 0.011 0.073 
probability of prescription drug use last 2 days 0.027 0.012 0.041 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days, in subsample of those who took at least 1 drug 
-0.002 -0.024 0.020 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days, in subsample of household income $0-9,999 
0.025 -0.047 0.097 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $10-19,999 
0.030 -0.006 0.067 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $20-29,999 
0.216 0.103 0.333 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $30-39,999 
0.095 -0.105 0.298 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $40-59,999 
0.102 -0.136 0.342 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $60,000+ 
-0.014 -0.384 0.364 
number of different prescription drugs used for acute 
conditions taken in the last 2 days 
0.094 0.033 0.155 
number of different prescription drugs used for chronic 
conditions taken in the last 2 days 
0.034 -0.004 0.071 
number of different over the counter drugs taken in the last 
2 days 
-0.012 -0.077 0.057 
number of consultations with general practitioners in the last 
12 months 
0.009 -0.017 0.038 
probability of at least one consultation with a general 
practitioner in the last 12 months 
0.010 0.001 0.019 
number of consultations with general practitioners in the last 
12 months, by those with at least 1 visit 
-0.004 -0.030 0.020 
 
Note: for models of number of drugs use or physician visits, elasticity defined as % change in 
outcome variable associated with 1% increase in drug charge.  For probability models, elasticity 
defined as absolute change in probability associated with 1% increase in drug charge. 
 
There is some evidence that seniors’ drug use is sensitive to household income.  Mean number of 
different drugs taken in the last 2 days increased from 1.08 for subjects with household income 
under $10,000 to 1.47 for subjects with household income between $40,000-$59,999, a relative 
increase of 36% (Table 6 and Figure 20).  The largest increase in drug use occurred when 
income increased above $10,000-$19,999.  Drug use tapered off slightly for those in the highest 
income bracket $60,000 and over. 
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Table 6 Estimated mean number of different prescription drugs used by seniors in the last 
2 days, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Household income Mean  Std. Err 95% Conf. 
Interval 
$0-9,999 1.077 0.066 0.952 1.213 
$10,000-19,999 1.146 0.032 1.087 1.208 
$20,000-29,999 1.427 0.070 1.299 1.578 
$30,000-39,999 1.417 0.108 1.215 1.643 
$40,000-59,999 1.470 0.122 1.245 1.724 
$60,000+ 1.263 0.150 1.007 1.598 
 
 
Figure 20 Mean number of different prescription drugs used by seniors in the last 2 days, 
by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
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3.4.2 Effects of drug charges and income on use of drugs and physician services by 
social assistance recipients  
 
Social assistance recipients appear to be somewhat more price sensitive than seniors (Table 7).  
The price elasticity of drug use for this group is –0.10 (95% CI: -0.15% to -0.05%), meaning that 
a 1% increase in MDC is associated with a –0.10% decrease in the number of different 
prescription drugs taken during the last 2 days.  Furthermore, the effects of cost sharing appear to 
operate though both the probability of any use and the number of different drugs taken by users.  
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There was some heterogeneity in the drug price sensitivity among individuals with different 
levels of household income.  Individuals with household income of $10,000-$19,999 were the 
most price responsive, with an elasticity estimate of –0.18.  The elasticity for the highest income 
group – those with incomes of $30,000 or more – had a larger elasticity, but this was not 
statistically different from zero.  The other income groups also had elasticity estimates that were 
not statistically different from zero at conventional levels.  Just as was the case for seniors, the 
price elasticity estimates for models of acute and chronic drug use differed; acute drug use 
seemed to be much more price responsive than chronic drug use.  Over the counter drug use was 
also price sensitive – the elasticity estimate was –0.16% (95% CI: -0.25% to -0.06%).  Drug 
price had only negligible impact on the number of primary care physician visits among social 
assistance recipients.  Finally, in contrast to what was observed among seniors, the mean drug 
use by social assistance recipients does not seem to vary with gross household income (Table 8 
and Figure 21).     
 
Table 7 Summary of estimated drug price elasticities for social assistance recipients by 
outcome variable, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Outcome Variable Mean 
Elasticity 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days 
-0.097 -0.146 -0.049 
probability of prescription drug use last 2 days -0.027 -0.047 -0.009 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days, in subsample of those who took at least 1 drug 
-0.032 -0.063 0.000 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days, in subsample of household income $0-9,999 
-0.032 -0.098 0.036 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $10-19,999 
-0.179 -0.254 -0.102 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $20-29,999 
-0.079 -0.314 0.151 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days in subsample of household income $30,000+ 
-0.419 -1.144 0.302 
number of different prescription drugs used for acute 
conditions taken in the last 2 days 
-0.161 -0.265 -0.062 
number of different prescription drugs used for chronic 
conditions taken in the last 2 days 
-0.056 -0.130 0.019 
number of different over the counter drugs taken in the last 
2 days 
-0.155 -0.249 -0.063 
number of consultations with general practitioners in the last 
12 months 
-0.033 -0.071 0.009 
probability of at least one consultation with a general 
practitioner in the last 12 months 
0.007 -0.004 0.019 
number of consultations with general practitioners in the last 
12 months, by those with at least 1 visit 
-0.035 -0.071 0.000 
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Note: for models of number of drugs use or physician visits, elasticity defined as % change in 
outcome variable associated with 1% increase in drug charge.  For probability models, elasticity 
defined as absolute change in probability associated with 1% increase in drug charge. 
 
 
Table 8 Estimated mean number of different prescription drugs used by social assistance 
recipients in the last 2 days, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
Household Income Mean Std. Error Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.615 0.034 0.551 0.687 
$10,000-19,999 0.581 0.024 0.536 0.623 
$20,000-29,999 0.596 0.074 0.465 0.756 
$30,000-39,999 0.626 0.210 0.311 1.109 
 
 
Figure 21 Estimated mean number of different prescription drugs used by social assistance 
recipients in the last 2 days, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence 
intervals 
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3.4.3 Effects of drug insurance coverage and income on use of drugs and physician 
services by general population  
 
Among the general population, our instrumental variables estimates suggest that the effect of 
holding drug insurance has virtually no effect on the number of different drugs taken in the last 2 
days.  Holding constant socio-economic, demographic and health status variables, those with 
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drug insurance coverage use about only 4% more drugs than those without insurance; moreover 
the confidence interval around this estimate includes zero.  There were differences observed in 
the effect of insurance coverage on acute versus chronic drug use – the insured used 46% more 
drugs for acute conditions than did the uninsured, but the estimate was somewhat imprecise.  On 
the other hand, the insured used 14% fewer drugs for chronic conditions than did the uninsured, 
but the confidence interval around this mean ranged from –59% to 25%, reflecting imprecision 
of the estimates.  The insured used about 66% more over the counter medications than did the 
uninsured, (this affect appeared to be estimated with some precision) but there was virtually no 
difference in the rates of primary care physician consults between the 2 groups. 
 
Table 9 Estimated percentage change in drug use and primary care physician visits 
between those with some versus no drug insurance coverage, general population, with 95% 
confidence intervals 
 
Outcome Variable Mean 
Elasticity 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 
days 
3.6 -23.4 32.1 
number of different prescription drugs used for acute 
conditions taken in the last 2 days 
46.0 -0.60 95.1 
number of different prescription drugs used for chronic 
conditions taken in the last 2 days 
-14.3 -58.7 25.0 
number of different over the counter drugs taken in the last 
2 days 
66.4 23.4 112.0 
number of consultations with general practitioners in the last 
12 months 
3.7 -19.5 23.8 
 
Note: elasticity defined as % difference in outcome variable between those with some drug 
insurance versus those with no drug insurance. 
 
We turn next to the effect of household income on the prescription drug use.  In contrast to 
earlier analyses, here we compare the difference in drug use of individuals with incomes $10,000 
and higher to those with income below this amount.  Table 10 below reveals that the drug use of 
those with income between $10,000-19,999 was virtually the same as those with less than 
$10,000 household income.  Very small differences in mean drug use were observed, however, 
between with $30,000-39,999 income relative to those with less than $10,000 (0.001 different 
drug difference).  The difference was only slightly larger for those with incomes $40,000-
$59,999 (0.016 difference) and those with $60,000 or higher income (0.037 difference). 
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Table 10 Estimated mean number of different prescription drugs used by general 
population last 2 days, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Household income Estimated difference in drug use 
compared to those with less than 
$10,000 household income 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
$10,000-19,999 0.000 -0.074 0.066 
$20,000-29,999 -0.020 -0.101 0.049 
$30,000-39,999 0.001 -0.084 0.062 
$40,000-59,999 0.016 -0.076 0.087 
$60,000+ 0.037 -0.053 0.111 
 
3.5 Effects of drug cost and income on use of specific medicines 
 
The focus in this section is on the effects of drug insurance on the use of so-called “essential” 
medications in the last month among individuals diagnosed with specific health conditions.  
Specifically we examine variation in the use versus non-use of insulin and pills for diabetes 
among diagnosed diabetics, use of high blood pressure medications among those with 
hypertension and use of “asthma medications” among those diagnosed with asthma.  It should be 
noted that this analysis does not identify variations in medications non-compliance associated 
with drug charges, beyond the simple use versus non-use of these drugs. 
 
Overall, our estimates indicate that use of specific “essential” medications is rather insensitive to 
the variations in drug charges observed in our data.  A 1% increase in MDC lowered the 
probability that a senior diagnosed with asthma would use an asthma medications in the last 
month by only 0.014 or by 1.4%.  The corresponding figure for social assistance recipients was 
1.9%, suggesting that social assistance recipients are slightly more price sensitive than seniors.  
In both cases, however, the confidence interval around the estimates included zero.  For general 
population respondents diagnosed with asthma, our results suggest that those with prescription 
drug insurance coverage are 8% less likely to have taken an asthma medication in the last month 
– a somewhat counterintuitive finding – but again the estimates are sufficiently imprecise that we 
could not reject the hypothesis that general population asthmatics are, in fact, completely price 
insensitive.   
 
Turning to the use of insulin or “pills for diabetes” among those diagnosed with diabetes, we see 
that again the effects of drug price on drug use are very negligible for seniors and social 
assistance recipients.  Diabetics in the general population with some drug coverage were 16% 
more likely to take insulin or “pills for diabetes” in the last month compared to those without 
insurance, but again the estimate was quite noisy.  The models of the probability of use of 
“medicine for blood pressure” among those diagnosed with hypertension paints a similar picture 
– seniors and social assistance recipients were virtually unresponsive to variations in drug price, 
whereas hypertensives in the general population with some drug insurance were about 14% less 
likely to use anti-hypertensives than those with no insurance, but this estimate could not be  
distinguished from zero. 
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Table 11 Summary of the estimated effects of drug insurance on the use of “essential” 
drugs among individuals diagnosed with specific chronic health problems, by target group 
 
Health Condition Target Drugs Target 
Group 
No. of 
obs. 
Elasticity
Estimate 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Seniors 189 -0.014 -0.091 0.001 
Social 
Assistance 
359 -0.019 -0.073 0.033 
Asthma 
 
“asthma 
medications ” 
General 
population  
3,124 -0.082 -0.245 0.142 
Seniors 329 0.009 -0.037 0.056 
Social 
Assistance 
121 0.012 -0.001 0.103 
Diabetes 
 
“Insulin” or 
“pills to 
control 
diabetes” General 
population  
1,123 0.155 -0.148 0.481 
Seniors 1,000 -0.002 -0.019 0.015 
Social 
assistance 
232 0.002 -0.043 0.053 
Hypertension 
 
“medicine for 
blood 
pressure” 
General 
population  
3,690 -0.135 -0.279 0.004 
 
Note: elasticity estimate for seniors and social assistance recipients represents the change in 
probability of use of target drug associated with 1% increase in MDC.  Elasticity estimate for 
general population represents difference in probability of target drug use between those with 
and without some prescription drug insurance. 
 
Next we turn to the effects of gross household income on the probability of use of drugs for 
asthma, diabetes and hypertension.  Higher amounts of household income lead to a higher 
probability of drug use, at least over certain ranges of income.  The probability of asthma 
medications use among elderly and general population asthmatics increases from $0 - $40,000 
then appears to drop off with higher levels of income.  Among social assistance recipients 
diagnosed with asthma, the probability of use of asthma drugs increases monotonically as 
income increases upwards from $10,000-$19,999.  
 
Among elderly diabetics, the probability of use of insulin or “pills for diabetes” appeared to 
increase from $0 to $39,999 then tapered off thereafter. In contrast, rates of drug use among 
social assistance recipients and the general population diagnosed with diabetes were relatively 
invariant to income.  Rates of use of anti-hypertensives were also relatively invariant to income 
for all three target groups. 
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Table 12 Estimated probability of use of asthma medications by seniors diagnosed with 
asthma, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Std. 
Error 
Conf. 
Interval 
$0-9,999 0.381 0.426 0.000 1.000 
$10,000-19,999 0.394 0.427 0.000 1.000 
$20,000-29,999 0.417 0.432 0.000 1.000 
$30,000-39,999 0.461 0.439 0.000 1.000 
$40,000-59,999 0.360 0.421 0.000 1.000 
$60,000+ 0.397 0.429 0.000 1.000 
 
 
 
Figure 22 Estimated probability of use of asthma medications by seniors diagnosed with 
asthma, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 13 Estimated probability of use of asthma medications last month by social 
assistance recipients diagnosed with asthma, by levels of gross household income, with 95% 
confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Std. Error Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.757 0.041 0.672 0.833 
$10,000-19,999 0.617 0.042 0.535 0.697 
$20,000-29,999 0.717 0.102 0.475 0.878 
$30,000+ 0.773 0.202 0.260 0.988 
 
 
Figure 23 Estimated probability of use of asthma medications last month by social 
assistance recipients diagnosed with asthma, by levels of gross household income, with 95% 
confidence intervals 
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Table 14 Estimated probability of use of asthma medications last month by general 
population diagnosed with asthma, by levels of gross household income, with 95% 
confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.548 0.446 0.644 
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$10,000-19,999 0.588 0.519 0.654 
$20,000-29,999 0.580 0.523 0.630 
$30,000-39,999 0.610 0.564 0.654 
$40,000-59,999 0.554 0.514 0.590 
$60,000+ 0.576 0.529 0.621 
 
 
 
Table 15 Estimated probability of use insulin or “pills for diabetes” by seniors diagnosed 
with diabetes, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Std. Error Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.664 0.092 0.460 0.822 
$10,000-19,999 0.733 0.034 0.663 0.796 
$20,000-29,999 0.721 0.063 0.584 0.829 
$30,000-39,999 0.800 0.095 0.573 0.942 
$40,000-59,999 0.329 0.132 0.110 0.618 
$60,000+ 0.749 0.190 0.289 0.976 
 
 
Figure 24 Estimated probability of use insulin or “pills for diabetes” by seniors diagnosed 
with diabetes, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 0.0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0
 $0-9,999
 $10,000-19,999
 $20,000-29,999
 $30,000-39,999
 $40,000-59,999
 $60,000+
 
 Probability of Drug Use
 
 
 
 
 42
Table 16 Estimated probability of use insulin or “pills for diabetes” last month by social 
assistance recipients diagnosed with diabetes, by levels of gross household income, with 
95% confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Std. Error Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.387 0.442 0.000 1.000 
$10,000-19,999 0.421 0.449 0.000 1.000 
$20,000-29,999 0.379 0.440 0.000 1.000 
$30,000+ 0.406 0.447 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Figure 25 Estimated probability of use of insulin or “pills for diabetes” last month by social 
assistance recipients diagnosed with diabetes, by levels of gross household income, with 
95% confidence intervals 
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Table 17 Estimated change in the probability of use of insulin or “pills for diabetes” by 
general population 19-64 years diagnosed with diabetes, by level of household income , with 
95% confidence intervals  
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.724 0.556 0.846 
$10,000-19,999 0.682 0.564 0.777 
$20,000-29,999 0.625 0.535 0.704 
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$30,000-39,999 0.668 0.595 0.728 
$40,000-59,999 0.675 0.596 0.734 
$60,000+ 0.637 0.543 0.721 
 
 
Table 18 Estimated probability of use “medicine for blood pressure” by seniors diagnosed 
with high blood pressure, by levels of gross household income, with 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Std. Error Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.810 0.037 0.730 0.875 
$10,000-19,999 0.877 0.014 0.848 0.903 
$20,000-29,999 0.819 0.034 0.746 0.879 
$30,000-39,999 0.861 0.046 0.758 0.933 
$40,000-59,999 0.896 0.050 0.768 0.967 
$60,000+ 0.835 0.078 0.639 0.949 
 
 
Figure 26 Estimated probability of use of 'medicine for blood pressure' by seniors 
diagnosed with high blood pressure, by levels of gross household income, with 95% 
confidence intervals 
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Table 19 Estimated probability of use of 'medicine for blood pressure' last month by social 
assistance recipients diagnosed with high blood pressure, by levels of gross household 
income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Std. Error Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.637 0.272 0.081 0.982 
$10,000-19,999 0.596 0.279 0.071 0.977 
$20,000-29,999 0.672 0.269 0.096 0.989 
$30,000+ 0.623 0.271 0.070 0.980 
 
 
Figure 27 Estimated probability of use of 'medicine for blood pressure' last month by social 
assistance recipients diagnosed with high blood pressure, by levels of gross household 
income, with 95% confidence intervals 
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Table 20 Estimated change in the probability of use of 'medicine for blood pressure' by 
general population 19-64 years diagnosed with high blood pressure, by levels of gross 
household income, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Household Income Estimated probability of 
drug use 
Conf. Interval 
$0-9,999 0.710 0.620 0.793 
$10,000-19,999 0.659 0.592 0.724 
$20,000-29,999 0.686 0.636 0.731 
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$30,000-39,999 0.713 0.672 0.749 
$40,000-59,999 0.720 0.688 0.753 
$60,000+ 0.708 0.663 0.748 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Drug charges in Canada, or “Do we need national pharmacare?”  Although there are several 
different reasons why governments might be interested in expanding subsidies for prescription 
drugs, a primary reason is to reduce financial barriers to drugs.  What financial barriers to drugs 
do Canadians currently face?  We distinguish between the financial barriers to drugs faced by 
seniors and social assistance recipients – those for whom provincial drug plans are a primary 
source of drug insurance coverage(16) and the remainder of the population – henceforth the 
“general population”.  Although all the non-Atlantic provincial governments offer some drug 
subsidies to the general population, benefits are typically far less generous than for seniors and 
social assistance recipients.  For, example, in all provinces except Alberta, benefits are paid only 
after household- level out of pocket spending exceeds a substantial deductible; deductibles in 
Saskatchewan, for example, are $850 semi-annually.  In Alberta, members of the general 
population must pay premiums to be eligible for government subsidized drug insurance.  Private, 
not public, drug insurance is therefore the primary source of insurance among most members of 
the general population(2).   
 
Expenditures on provincial drug programs have been the fastest growing component of public 
health care expenditures in Canada(17), and total expenditures on drugs is now equal to the 
expenditure on physician services(18).  One of the primary responses of provincial governments 
drug plans to rising drug expenditures has been to introduce or increase beneficiary user 
fees(16), most typically for their senior beneficiaries.  Figure 28, below, simulates the annual 
provincial weighted average 3 out of pocket drug cost facing a single senior with $540 annual 
drug expenditures (18 prescriptions per year, each costing $30) over the period 1986 – 1997.  
Because low income seniors typically receive more comprehensive public drug insurance 
coverage than do higher income seniors, separate cost schedules are presented by seniors’ 
income status.  Low income seniors are assumed to have household income of $15,000 and 
receive the federal Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS); high income seniors are assumed to 
have household income of $25,000 and not receive GIS.  As is clear from the figure, copayment 
rates have increased substantially over the 12 year period.  In 1986, a low income senior was 
required to pay $24 of the $540 drug cost; in 1997 this figure was $174, an increase of 625%.  
Cost sharing increases were higher for higher income seniors.  Out of pocket drug expenses for 
higher income seniors grew from $31 in 1986 to $272 in 1997, an increase of 777%. 
                                                 
3 Provincial weights were the proportion of the total Canadian population of individuals 65 and older 
residing in the respective provinces.  Population data are from the 1996 Census of Canada (Statistics 
Canada, 1997).  
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Figure 28  Canadian average out-of-pocket expenses for a senior (65 and older) incurring $540 annual drug expenses: 1986 – 
1997, by GIS recipiency status. 
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Recent studies have estimated the number of Canadians by level of drug insurance coverage (full, 
partial or none) and by various socio-economic and demographic characteristics (such as age, sex 
and employment status).  Less attention has been paid, however, to the distribution of direct 
charges for prescription drugs paid by senior and social assistance beneficiaries of the provincial 
drug plans and how these charges vary by province.  We used the NPHS data to address this 
question. 
 
We found considerable inter-provincial variation in direct charges for senior beneficiaries of the 
provincial drug plans.  Mean charges ranged from $0 (Ontario 1994-95) to $26.62 (Saskatchewan 
1996-97).   Consistent with the graph above, drug charges for seniors were increasing, especially 
for residents of 2 of Canada’s most populous provinces – Ontario and Quebec.  Charges for 
social assistance recipients were much lower – most provinces charged nothing, and those that 
did charge, typically charged $2 per prescription.  A notable except was the province of Quebec, 
which introduced deductibles and coinsurance rates exceeding $6 per prescription in 1996-1997. 
 
There is considerable variation in the rates of insurance coverage among the general population.  
It has been estimated that 10% of Canadians do not have any drug insurance coverage, and a 
further 10% are under- insured (paying 35 percent or more of their costs out of pocket)(2).  The 
10% of the population who are uninsured are likely non-elderly not receiving social assistance 
benefits who are not members of an employment-related, professional association or student 
group drug plan(2); individuals not enrolled in such plans wishing to purchase drug insurance 
often face substantial direct charges well in excess of their expected drug costs.  It also appears 
that a substantial proportion of the 10% of the under- insured are those with labour force 
attachments but either work in occupations without comprehensive coverage or work on a part 
time basis (2).4  
 
There already has been some research on the association between the socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of those in the general population and their level of drug insurance 
coverage.  These studies, however, have examined univariate associations between drug 
insurance coverage and individual characteristics and are unable to disentangle whether it is the 
individual characteristic itself, or other factors associated with the individual characteristic that 
are responsible for the correlation.  For example, while other studies(2;19) have found that those 
with higher levels of household income have a higher probability of drug insurance coverage, it 
is unclear if the “causal” factor is income, or factors associated with income, such as education 
and labour force activity (labour force participation, and if in the labour force, ones sector of 
employment).  In the absence of direct public provision of prescription drug insurance (through, 
for example, a national pharmacare plan), one policy option to increase the uptake of prescription 
drug insurance among the general population is to change those individual characteristics (such 
as income, education and labour force activity) which are associated with it.  Which factor to 
change, e.g. increasing income among the working poor by tax reform; providing tuition 
subsidies and income contingent loans to encourage additional training; encouraging female 
labour force participation by subsidizing day care; depends on knowledge of the determining 
factors.  Hence, our focus is on the effects of specific characteristics on the probability of some 
                                                 
4 There is little evidence that rates of beneficiary cost sharing have recently increased among the private 
insurance plans.  Instead, it appears that the private plans have reacted to expenditure growth by 
restricting access to specific high cost medications through the use of drug formularies(80). 
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(versus no) drug insurance coverage among the general population, holding all other factors 
constant.   
 
Our results point to three important determinants of drug insurance coverage among the general 
population 19-64 years of age.  The first is household income, which is not entirely surprising – 
those with higher levels of household income are better able to pay for drug insurance coverage 
or perhaps those in higher paying jobs have more comprehensive drug insurance employee 
benefits.  The likelihood of insurance increases monotonically from 40% for those with incomes 
of $10,000-$19,999 to 80% for those with incomes of $60,000 or more.  After controlling for 
income, however, we discovered interesting differences in coverage by occupational categories: 
77% of technicians, high level management and full time students reported insurance, whereas 
only 30% of farmers, 43% of farm labourers and 44% of self-employed professionals did.  After 
controlling for income and occupational categories, the only discernable effect of education was 
observed between those who had and had not graduated from highschool, the former having 
about a 5% higher probability of insurance coverage.  The interprovincial differences in drug 
insurance coverage were surprising, given the many socio-economic and demographic factors 
that had been controlled for.  Coverage rates were highest in 2 of Canada’s richest provinces, 
Alberta and Ontario (73%) and lowest in Saskatchewan (44%), Manitoba (53%) and BC (60%). 
 
Potential effects of drug fees on health and health care costs.  In the short-term, drug user fees 
reduce drug benefit program expenditures through 2 separate effects.  First, user fees reduce 
program expenditures by the share of costs assumed by the user.  Second, if health care use is 
price-sensitive, overall use declines.  If one thinks of the total drug expenditures as represented 
by a pie, by introducing or increasing drug charges, the insurance agency becomes responsible 
for a smaller share of a potentially smaller expenditure pie.   
 
Drug cost sharing may have additional consequences.  While some claim that user fees will 
selectively deter “frivolous” health care use, (which can be interpreted as health care which has 
negligible or even harmful effects on health) others argue that the opposite is true.  It is well 
established that consumers typically lack the information required to assess the expected effect of 
health care on health status (20).  Hence, when faced with user fees, uninformed consumers may 
relinquish health care that might have deleterious effects on their health – choices that would not 
have been made had they been better informed.  Referring to the diagram below, in the face of 
increases in drug user fees, patients might either (a) reduce the probability of visiting a 
prescribing physician or (b) be less compliant with prescribed drug regimens, both of which 
might adversely affect health status – process (d).  It is plausible tha t physicians’ prescribing 
choices are affected by their patients’ drug insurance status.  A physician might substitute lower 
cost prescription drugs, over the counter drugs, additional counseling (his/her own time), and, in 
rare cases, surgery for specific prescription drugs if the patient has inadequate prescription drug 
insurance coverage – process (c).  In principle, because the physician typically has better 
knowledge than the patient of the effects of health care on patient health, physician-initiated 
therapeutic substitutions should have a smaller adverse effect on patient health than treatment 
decisions made solely by the patient.  Distinguishing physician from patient- initiated changes in 
drug use following changes in drug user fees might therefore predict the likely effects on patient 
health status. 
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Figure 29  Path diagram of the effects of drug user fees on patient health status and health 
care costs 
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The impact of user fees differs by beneficiary characteristics.  Fees do not affect those with 
no medical need for drugs – such individuals would not take drugs even if they were free of 
charge.  Conversely, the financial burden of user fees increases with one’s use for drugs.  
Because income and other measures of ability to pay are strongly positively correlated with 
health status(21), low income individuals potentially face the highest financial burden from user 
fees.  Further, standard economic theory predicts that one’s price sensitivity of demand for a 
good or service is inversely related to one’s ability to pay: in the face of an increase in drug 
charges, the poor are likely to curtail drug use by a greater amount than the rich.  Hence those 
with the largest need for health services might be those who are most deterred from consuming 
health services by user fees. 
 
While user fees might reduce drug benefit program expenditures in the short run, the long-term 
effect on overall health care expenses is unclear.  If higher drug user fees adversely affect patient 
health, then physician visits, hospitalizations and even additional prescribing might ensue – 
process (e) – thereby offsetting some of the cost savings to the drug program.  Moreover, user 
fees, as well as exclusions of large segments of the population from public drug coverage, expose 
individuals to the risk of incurring drug expenses (process (f)), motivating risk averse individuals 
to purchase private drug coverage.  Hence user fees generate multiple sources of finance for 
prescription drugs – process (g).  But as Evans, Barer and Stoddart(22) argue: “The key to cost 
control is, or at least has been to date, the containment of overall budgets, either through a single 
payer system as in Canada, or a large number of closely co-ordinated payment agencies as in 
Germany.  But the more independent sources of funding there are, the more difficult is cost 
control.”  Hence, although public programs have been able to shift costs to others, the 
introduction of multiple sources of finance may have increased overall pharmaceutical costs  – 
process (g).  To the extent that user fees increase publicly funded expenditures on health care, 
drug user fees might increase – process (i) – thereby propagating further increases in health care 
costs. 
  
How do our results conform with the existing evidence on these issues?  Appendix 1 provides 
a comprehensive review of the existing research evidence, a summary of which is provided here.  
The literature indicates tha t higher drug user fees are associated lower rates of drug use.  For 
most individuals, however, a 1% increase in drug prices lowers drug use by less than 1%.  Hence 
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the “price elasticity” of drug use – defined as the percentage change in drug use due to a 1% 
increase in drug price – is less than 1 in absolute value.  Most estimates are clustered between -
0.1% and -0.3%.  Drug benefit programs which use direct charges to reduce program 
expenditures will therefore do so primarily by shifting the financial burden of drugs to consumers 
– overall drug use will not decline by a large extent.  There are 2 corollaries to this.  First, the 
converse to the previous statement holds as well – if drug use is largely price insensitive, then a 
national pharmacare program (i.e. increased public subsidization of prescription drugs) will 
simply redistribute income from government to drug consumers, where the size of the income 
transfer is greater, the larger is drug use.  Because our results suggest that drug use increases with 
income, holding constant health status, additional public drug subsidies applied equally to rich 
and poor alike may very well provide a bigger benefit to those who are better off.  The second 
corollary is that, because the drug use of the average individual is not very price sensitive, it is 
unlikely that their health status will be adversely affected by changes in drug charges.   
 
Our results for seniors and the general population are supportive of this view.  The drug use of 
seniors with average characteristics (income, age, etc) (where drug use is measured by the 
number of different prescription drugs taken in the last 2 days) is largely unresponsive to the 
price charged for drugs and, those in the general population with better access to drug insurance 
appear to use about the same number of drugs as those without good access to drug insurance.  
 
There are a number of reasons why prescription drug use is rather price insensitive in the general 
population.  First, when drug fees include a component which is invariant to drug ingredient cost, 
such as when the beneficiary pays some fraction of the dispensing fee, or when there is a flat per-
prescription charge, physicians tend to reduce the expenditure burden on their patients by 
increasing prescription sizes and issuing fewer prescriptions.  This is consistent with the effects 
of a prescription dispensing fee copayment introduced by the BC Ministry of Health Pharmacare 
seniors drug plan in 1987 and the introduction of fixed copayments and deductibles by the 
Ontario Drug Benefit program in 1996 – prescription sizes increased and the number of 
prescriptions decreased such that the overall volume of units of prescription drugs dispensed did 
not change much.  Second, when the charge is some proportion of drug ingredient cost, there is 
some external evidence that physicians mitigate the effects of charges on their patients by 
substituting lower cost for higher drugs; for example substituting generic for brandname or 
substituting low for high cost drugs with similar therapeutic effect.  Evidence of the impact of 
drug fees on the substitution of over the counter for prescription drugs is weaker – some studies 
have found such an effect to exist, while others have not.  Our study investigated this issue and 
did not find any evidence that individuals facing higher prescription drug costs tended to 
substitute over the counter for prescription drugs. 
 
The overall finding – that drug use by most individuals is typically not very price sensitive – is 
subject to three important caveats.  The first is that these results are conditional upon the extent 
of variation in cost sharing observed in empirical analyses.  Most of these studies have exploited 
only rather modest changes in cost sharing in the context of public drug benefit programs.  Price 
elasticity estimates over higher levels of cost sharing may very well demonstrate greater price 
sensitivity (as standard economic theory predicts), hence drug programs which introduce 
substantial cost sharing might find unexpected changes in drug use, patient health and associated 
health care costs.  Only the RAND Health Insurance Experiment considered the effects of large 
 51
variations in drug insurance – from 100% coverage to 5% coverage – yet even in this study, 
subjects faced a maximum out of pocket limit and were compensated for expenses so that they 
would not be made worse off by entering the study.  (Furthermore, the study excluded the 
elderly, and drug cost sharing was fully confounded by changes in cost sharing for physicians’ 
services.) 
 
Alas, our study was hampered by the same issues.  We could not use about 75% of the 
observations on seniors owing to problems of measuring prescription drug coverage – this 
reduced the usable variation in interprovincial drug prices and as a consequence most of the 
seniors faced charges under $10 – the single most common charge was $0.  
 
The second caveat is that the nature of our drug utilization measures only 1 dimension of drug 
use – the number of different drugs taken.  While this variable is sensit ive to discontinuations of 
drugs and additions to the number of drugs taken, it is insensitive to changes in the dosage of 
each drug taken, assuming that the individual did not stop taking the drug all together.  One 
would therefore expect our price elasticity estimates to be smaller (in absolute value) than 
estimates that use a continuous measure of prescription drug use.  Moreover, our elasticity 
estimates for those in the general population were particularly noisy, possibly owing to the fact 
that we needed to use the “instrumental variables” estimator, instead of the more efficient linear 
regression estimator.  Hence our results based on the samples of individuals in the general 
population should be interpreted with some caution. 
 
The third caveat is that while it is likely true that drug elasticities are small for most individuals, 
there is some evidence to suggest that individuals with lower income and health status are more 
price sensitive.  Hence an increase in drug fees will result in proportionately larger reductions in 
drug use among the sick poor relative to the rest of the population.  It also appears that drug fees 
applied to such groups have adverse effects on health status and increase subsequent health care 
costs (physicians’ services and hospitalizations) – such effects are typically not observed among 
higher income individuals.  Hence, while modest increases in drug fees are innocuous for the 
majority of the population, this is not necessarily the case for the sick poor.  The implications for 
a national pharmacare program are clear – if one of its goals is to promote health, then drug 
subsidies should be targeted at those for whom drug prices are a large barrier to access. 
 
To examine this, we estimated separate price elasticities by beneficiary income and health status.  
First, we estimated separate models for social assistance recipients, who by definition have 
relatively low incomes; this facilitates comparison to elasticity estimates for seniors and the 
general population.  Second, for seniors and social assistance recipients we estimated separate 
elasticities for those with varying levels of gross household income.  Third, we determined the 
effects of drug charges on the use of potentially needed medications by those with specific 
chronic disorders.  The NPHS identifies respondents’ chronic health problems as well as the 
names of prescription drugs taken over the previous two days.  Using these data we estimated the 
effect of interprovincial variations in the use of insulin and oral glyceamics among individuals 
diagnosed with diabetes, anti-hypertensives use among those diagnosed with high blood pressure, 
and asthma medications among individuals with asthma.   
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What can be inferred from such an analysis?   Because we used cross-sectional data, we cannot 
explore the dynamic effects of drug fees on drug use and changes in drug use on health.  We can, 
however, still make some limited inferences on the effects of drug fees on health.  On the face of 
it, if medicines are always used in a clinically appropriate manner, then a policy which removes 
financial barriers to care will increase the health of those most in need of care.  But our data 
cannot speak directly to the question of whether the drug use being induced or deterred by user 
charges is essential or appropriate because the appropriateness of a drug therapy is specific to 
each clinical situation and we had no information on the clinical indications for their use.  It 
seems plausible, however, that a positive fraction of the services induced or deterred by co-
payments satisfy the criteria of appropriateness.  If the rate of inappropriate drug use is similar 
for individuals in each health status level, then such an analysis can indicate if the use of 
“appropriate” drugs varies by levels of health care need. 
 
Our study provides evidence that social assistance recipients are indeed substantially more price 
responsive than seniors and those in the general population.  What’s more interesting is that 
social assistance recipients’ drug use was sensitive to price variations in the range of $0 - $6.  
Hence individuals with low income do not necessarily need to face substantial drug charges for 
them to relinquish prescription medicines.  Analysis of the differences in price elasticities by 
income level of social assistance recipients produced qualitatively similar but weaker evidence.  
We found that social assistance recipients with incomes of $10,000-$19,999 had statistically 
significant price elasticities, whereas those with higher incomes did not.  On the other hand, those 
with incomes between $0-$9,999 had insignificant elasticities as well, which is somewhat 
counterintuitive.  One plausible explanation for this difference is that respondents claiming 
household incomes below $10,000 might be under-representing income for strategic reasons.  
Indeed a substantial number of social assistance recipients reported having no income – which 
seems implausible as the NPHS was a residential survey.  Moreover, other analysis of drug 
utilization suggest that those with reported incomes of under $10,000 have drug use similar to 
those with incomes over $20,000.  In contrast to social assistance recipients, we found no 
evidence that seniors’ price elasticity varies with income.  It is possible however that current 
household income is a less useful measure of ability to pay for seniors than other measures, such 
as accumulated assets. 
 
Analysis of the effects of drug charges on the use (vs. non-use) of potentially needed medications 
– insulin and “pills for diabetes” use among those diagnosed with diabetes for example – 
generally showed that the probability of drug use was generally independent of drug charges, 
even among the social assistance recipients.  Again, an interpretive word of caution is in order – 
the drug use question pertains to whether or not the drug was used at any time during the last 4 
weeks.  Hence, our analysis does not identify variations in medications non-compliance 
associated with drug charges, beyond the simple use versus non-use of these drugs during at least 
1 point in the last 4 weeks.  Future analysis will measure use of specific medicines using 
information on detailed two day drug use. 
 
Another objective of our study was to estimate separate models to determine the differential 
effects of drug fees for chronic and acute prescription drugs.  The NPHS lists the names of the 
drugs taken during the 2 days prior to the survey, which we categorized as being those 
prescription drugs taken on a chronic basis and those taken on an acute basis.  Prescription drug 
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fees will impose different financial burdens on patients depending on whether drugs are taken on 
a chronic basis (i.e. for an indefinite period of time) or are used primarily for acute conditions.  
Hence it is of some interest to estimate prescription drug elasticities for each type of drug.   
 
We found that for seniors, higher prescription drug prices lead to a small increase in the use of 
drugs for acute conditions (the elasticity was 0.09%), but had no impact on the use of drugs for 
chronic conditions.  It is unclear if this is a statistical artefact or a novel discovery.  For social 
assistance recipients, higher drug prices translated into lower use of acute drugs (elasticity -
0.16%), but only a minor and statistically insignificant decrease in the use of drugs for chronic 
conditions.  The insured general population respondents used 46% more drugs for acute 
conditions than did the uninsured, but the estimate was somewhat imprecise.  On the other hand, 
the insured used 14% fewer drugs for chronic cond itions than did the uninsured, but the 
confidence interval around this mean ranged from –59% to 25%, reflecting significant 
imprecision of the estimates.  Our models therefore provide some consensus that drug charges do 
not seem to effect the use of drugs for chronically taken medications but have some impacts on 
the use of drugs for acute conditions. 
 
We also sought to assess how variations in household income affect the use of prescription 
medicines, holding constant health status and other socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics.  One common interpretation of the association between income and prescription 
drug use begins with the proposition that everyone should have unfettered access to needed 
health services, including those prescription medicines which are health improving.  Holding 
health status constant, a positive association between income and use of health services is 
undesirable because those with limited means are consuming less needed drugs than are those 
who are better off.  One policy prescription is to subsidize the prescription drug use of those with 
limited means, thereby reducing the financial barriers to access for this group and encouraging 
their use of drugs.  On the other hand, it is possible that even the rich will choose to forgo the 
purchase of potentially health improving drugs, preferring instead to spend their incomes 
elsewhere.  In this case, one policy prescription would be to provide prescription drug subsidies 
to everyone, regardless of income.   
 
The validity of this policy prescription hinges on the proposition that health care is different from 
other goods and services, in that nobody should face financial barriers to the use of effective care.  
If, on the other hand, prescription drugs were treated like any other good or service, then a 
positive correlation between income and prescription drug use would not be grounds for public 
subsidy.  There is likely a positive correlation between the purchase of luxury cars and income, 
for example: only rich people purchase Mercedes Benz automobiles.  Hence a public subsidy of 
luxury cars would benefit only the rich. 
 
The evidence regarding the effects of household income on drug use was mixed.  For seniors, the 
mean number of different drugs taken in the last 2 days increased from 1.08 for subjects with 
household income under $10,000 to 1.47 for subjects with household income between $40,000-
$59,999, a relative increase of 36%.  The largest increase in drug use occurred when income 
increased above $10,000-$19,999.  Drug use did, however, taper off slightly for those in the 
highest income bracket $60,000 and over, possibly reflecting the effects of higher health status 
not controlled for by the health status variables included in the model.  For the general population 
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and social assistance recipients, drug use increased with income, but only by the smallest of 
margins. 
 
Our final objective was to assess the extent to which differences in drug charges are associated 
with variations in the number of physician visits.  There are several reasons why one might 
expect drug fees to affect visits: (a) individuals whose primary motivation for initiating visits is 
to receive a prescription may not do so if forced to pay a drug fee; and (b) individuals who do not 
seek care after an increase in fees might become sicker and subsequently consult with their 
physician more often.  Hence expanding the public subsidies for prescription drugs (in the form 
of national pharmacare) might have spill-over effects on other sectors of the public health care 
system.  Again limitations with cross sectional data prevent us from distinguishing the two 
sources of change to physician visits.  We are able, however, to identify the net effect of changes 
in drug fees on contemporaneous physician visits. 
 
For seniors and those in the general population, drug charges had virtually no effect on the 
number of physician visits.  Among social assistance recipients, higher drug charges were a small 
deterrent to seeking primary care: a 1% increase in drug charges was associated with a –0.03% 
decrease in visits.  Moreover this was found to be most evident among those who had already 
seen a physician at least once in the past year and were likely under physician supervision.  The 
drug charges had little impact on the probability of consulting a physician at least once over the 
course of a year. 
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Appendix 1  Literature review of the effects of prescription drug cost sharing 
 
Effects of drug user fees on overall drug use.  Most studies have been unable to distinguish 
patient- and physician- initiated changes in drug use following changes to drug user fees.  Instead, 
analysts typically estimate drug price sensitivity which ostensibly reflect some combination of 
behavioural reactions on the part of both prescriber and patient.  The price sensitivity of drug use 
is commonly expressed as an “elasticity”, defined as the percentage change in drug use 
associated with a small (1%) increase in drug prices.  This measure is useful because it is 
invariant to the measurement units of prices and drug consumption.  The literature indicates that 
for most individuals, drug price elasticities are well under 1 in absolute value, meaning that a 
percentage increase in price reduces consumption by less than 1%.  However, as expected, low 
income are more price sensitive (i.e. have larger price elasticities, in absolute value) than higher 
income.  Moreover, as standard economic theory predicts, estimates are larger when the base line 
price is higher; it is therefore important to indicate the range in prices used to generate elasticity 
estimates. 
 
The published evidence on the price sensitivity of drug use has been obtained from changes to 
drug benefit programs in the context of the UK National Health Service (23-27), US 
Medicaid(28-39), US state drug subsidy programs for seniors(40-42), US Health Maintenance 
Organizations(43;44), drug benefit plans offered by US employer groups(45;46), the RAND 
health insurance experiment (HIE)(47;48), Canadian provincial drug benefit programs(49-54), as 
well as drug benefit programs in Australia(55), Belgium(56), the Netherlands(57), and 
Russia(58). 
 
The UK NHS studies exploited the 700% increase in the real per-prescription charges applied to 
the non-exempt UK population during various periods between 1969 – 1992.  Pregnant women, 
mothers of infants, those in receipt of social security benefits and those with low income, and 
after 1974, children under 16 years, and women over 60 years were exempted from charges.  
Most of the elasticity estimates across the 5 studies are clustered between –0.10 to –0.30, 
meaning that a 10% increase in fees would reduce drug consumption of those with middle to high 
income between 1 – 3%.  The RAND HIE randomized US households whose members were 
neither elderly nor low income into health care insurance plans with varying levels of cost 
sharing for both drugs and medical services.  The experiment yielded price elasticities around –
0.17 for ambulatory services with co-insurance rates of 0 to 25% and around –0.31 with 
coinsurance rates of 25-95%.  The price elasticity for drugs were smaller:  –0.1 with co- insurance 
rates of 0 to 25% and about –0.2 with coinsurance rates of 25-95%.  Because these estimates also 
reflect the effects of cost sharing for physicians’ services on drug use, elasticities estimated using 
variation in drug price alone would likely be smaller. 
 
Analysis of the effects of cost sharing within the context of US employer groups produced very 
small price elasticity estimates.  One would expect that the individuals in these groups would be 
non-elderly with above average health status.  Motheral(45) found virtually no response in 
overall drug use to an increase in the copayment for brandname drugs from US$10-15, noting 
that differential charges on brandname drugs promoted substitutions to free generic drugs.  
Smith(46) reported a price elasticity of –0.10 for copayments in the range US$1-8.  This 
elasticity estimate pertained to the number of prescriptions filled, not the quantity of units of drug 
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consumed.  Because the effect of the copayment was to increase prescription sizes, Smith notes 
that the elasticity estimate is likely somewhat smaller than –0.1.  Using data on non-elderly 
members of a large HMO in Washington state, Harris et al(43) estimated prescription price 
elasticities of –0.05 for copayments in the range US$0-1.50 and –0.16 for copayments in the 
range $US 1.50-3.00.  Again these copays increased prescription sizes, so the drug units price 
elasticity estimates are likely to be smaller.   
 
Medicare, the US health care subsidy program for seniors, does not provide prescription benefits, 
although seniors with very low income levels can qualify for drug benefits as part of the state 
Medicaid system.  Still, many low income seniors earn too much to qualify for Medicaid.  Eleven 
US states have, however, established drug benefit programs for low income seniors.  Coulson et 
al(41;42) used health survey data to assess the effects of a prescription drug subsidy program for 
low income Medicare recipients in the state of Pennsylvania.  Respondents enrolled in this 
program reported filling 0.3 more prescriptions in the 2 week recall period than did elderly 
patients with neither an employer-sponsored plan nor a Medicare supplement plan that covers 
prescriptions.  The corresponding price elasticity estimate was relatively high at –0.34.  Similar 
estimates have been obtained from analyses of drug charges applied to low income Medicaid 
recipients(28-39).  
 
Grootendorst(53) used longitudinal administrative prescription claims data from the BC Ministry 
of Health Pharmacare program to assess the effects of an extension in drug benefits at age 65.  
Pharmacare currently insures 70% of drug costs in excess of a $800 deductible for those under 
65, but provides 100% coverage of drug ingredient cost (with a dispensing fee copayment) at age 
65.   He found that for most seniors, the extension of drug benefits has little if any impact on real 
drug expenditures.  The exception were low income males – their consumption increased 
dramatically at age 65. Grootendorst(49), using data from the 1990 Ontario Health Survey, found 
that the availability of publicly-funded prescription drug insurance at age 65 had differential 
effects on the number of different prescription drugs reported as being consumed in the 4 weeks 
prior to the survey.  Increases in drug use were concentrated primarily among individuals with 
lower levels of health status (2 or more chronic health problems) without prior drug insurance 
coverage.  Individuals with just 1 chronic health problem consumed an additional 0.15 drugs at 
age 65 (not statistically different from zero at conventional levels), whereas those with 4 health 
problems consumed 0.60 additional drugs and those with 5 health problems consumed 1.12 
additional drugs.  Maritime Medical Inc.(50) assessed the effects of a $3 per prescription 
copayment, subject to an $150 annual maximum, levied on senior beneficiaries of the Nova 
Scotia drug program in June, 1990.  Prior to this, seniors faced no drug charges.  The copayment 
was found to reduce the number of prescriptions by 5.6%, but increase prescription size so that 
the average quantity used per patient remained unchanged.  The study did not estimate separate 
price elasticities by beneficiary income or health status.   
 
Effects of drug user fees on probability of seeking physician care.  Drug fees can affect 
patients’ propensity to seek physician care for 2 offsetting reasons.  On the one hand, patients 
whose primary motivation for initiating visits is to receive a prescription may not do so if forced 
to pay a drug fee.  On the other hand, if individuals who do not seek care after an increase in fees 
become sicker, then visits might rise.  One might therefore expect an increase in user fees to 
initially lower the patient’s propensity to initiate care, but if health is adversely affected, visits 
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might eventually increase.  The converse holds in the event of a decrease in drug fees.  
Longitudinal data on drug use, health status and physician visits are required to tease these 
effects apart, but no study has exploited these types of data.   
 
The weight of the small body of evidence suggests that drug user fees do not have a large net 
effect on patient’s propensity to seek physician care.  Grootendorst(59), using data from the 1990 
Ontario Health Survey, found that the availability of publicly-funded prescription drug insurance 
at age 65 had little effect on the propensity of those without prior private insurance coverage to 
seek physician care.  Similarly, using longitudinal prescription drug claims data, Grootendorst 
found that the availability of full coverage of drug ingredient cost at age 65 by the BC Ministry 
of Health Pharmacare program had no discernable effects on subsequent physician visits(59).  
Lingle et al(60) found that New Jersey Medicare recipients, who in 1977 became eligible for the 
“Pharmaceutical Assistance to the Aged” program, did not make any more physician visits over 
the next 4 years than Medicare recipients in the neighboring state of Pennsylvania, who were 
ineligible for publicly funded drug benefits.  Johnson et al(44)  found that moderate increases of 
from $1 to $3, from $3 to $5 per prescription fo r Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a health 
maintenance organization had no effect on their physician visits.  On the other hand, Kozma et 
al(61) found that relaxation of restrictions on prescribing of 323 different drugs on the South 
Carolina Medicaid drug formulary had a modest one-time increase in the number of physician 
visits by Medicaid beneficiaries.  The generalizability of this study of formulary restrictions on 
specific drugs to the effects of user fees – which apply to all drugs – is unclear.   
 
Effects of drug fees on patient compliance with prescription regimens and physician 
prescribing.  Patient compliance with prescription regimens can be defined both in terms of their 
propensity to fill prescriptions written by physicians and their propensity to take filled 
prescriptions as directed.  The existing evidence on patient compliance has focused only on the 
former measure.  Begg(62) and Beardon et al(63) audited prescriptions written by general 
practitioners practicing in the UK and USA, respectively, and found that the rate of non-
redemption of the prescriptions was higher, the higher the level of patient cost sharing.  Poirier et 
al(51) assessed the effects of a $2 per prescription copayment, subject to an $100 annual 
maximum, levied on middle to high income senior beneficiaries of the Quebec drug program in 
May, 1992.  Prior to this, seniors faced no drug charges.  Seniors receiving the maximum 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), a federal subsidy for low income seniors, were exempted 
from the copayment.  In 1994, senior couples with an income of less than $14,352 and single 
seniors with an income of less than $11,016 were eligible for the maximum GIS benefit.  The 
study focused on the effects of the copay on refill rates for 2 classes of drugs: anti-hypertensives 
and benzodiazepines and were also able to merge 1991 Census data on seniors’ neighbourhood-
level income levels.  The  authors found that refills for benzodiazepines were virtually unaffected 
by the copay; Refill rates declined for antihypertensives, but the estimated elasticities were very 
small: -0.011 for low income seniors and –0.017 for high income seniors.  Other stud ies(64;65) 
have surveyed patients regarding reasons for non-compliance with drug prescriptions and have 
found that ability and/or willingness to pay to be an important factor. 
  
There is also some information on how physicians prescribing choices are affected by knowledge 
of their patients’ drug insurance coverage status.  Hux and Naylor(66) mailed out surveys to 
Ontario physicians to assess this issue.  Physicians were asked to select which of 6 antibiotics, 
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with varying prices, they would prescribe in a given clinical scenario.  Information on antibiotic 
drug prices and the patient’s drug insurance coverage status were randomly assigned to the 
scenarios.  Rates of prescribing the more expensive antibiotics did not vary by patient drug plan 
status when no information on prices were given.  However, when information on drug prices 
was presented, knowledge of their patient’s drug insurance mattered: 18% of patients with drug 
insurance were prescribed expensive antibiotics versus just 8% of those without drug insurance. 
 
There is also evidence that physicians attempt to mitigate the financial burden of certain types of 
drug user fees by altering prescription sizes.  If the per prescription charge includes a component 
which does not vary with the drug ingredient cost – such as a fixed dollar amount per 
prescription or some percentage of a [fixed] drug dispensing fee – then beneficiaries can reduce 
their expenditures by filling fewer, but larger prescriptions, i.e. by having their physicians 
increase the number of units per prescription.  Indeed, unpublished data held by the author 
corroborates this hypothesis.  In April 1987, the BC Ministry of Health Pharmacare program 
required senior beneficiaries to assume 75% of the dispensing fee, up to an annual maximum of 
$125.  In 1994, seniors paid the entire dispensing fee to $200 annually.  Analyses of the total 
units of drug dispensed to seniors, as well as the number of prescriptions dispensed and the units 
per prescription before and after these copayments revealed that prescriptions dispensed dropped, 
but the units per prescription increased, so as to leave the total number of units dispensed to 
seniors virtually unchanged. 
 
There is little evidence on the extent to which physicians substitute prescription drugs for other 
health care inputs when their patients face a change in their insurance coverage status.  There is 
evidence that some physicians substitute prescribing for their time spent with patients(67;68), but 
no evidence exists on how this substitution varies with drug fees.  Nor is there evidence on how 
drug fees affect rates of surgical and other procedures.  There is mixed evidence that prescription 
drugs and over the counter are substitutes.  It should be noted, however, that both physicians and 
patients can make decisions about such substitutions.  O’Brien(23) found that each 1% increase 
the retail price of over the counter drug products in the UK increased the use of prescription 
drugs by 0.22%.  Stuart et al(69), using survey data on elderly Medicare beneficiaries, assessed 
the extent to which variations in prescription drug fees affected the probability that respondents 
would use over the counter preparations vs. prescription drugs to treat their health problems.  
OTC drug use was found to be lower among those with more comprehensive prescription drug 
insurance coverage.  Patients were asked to indicate the presence of 22 health problems; 10 of 
these problems were categorized as “minor”, including minor stomach and intestinal pain, sleep 
problems, constipation and diarrhea, colds and allergies; 12 problems were “more serious”, 
including depression, seizures, heart problems and diabetes.  The authors found that prescription 
drug user fees affected over the counter substitution primarily for “minor” health problems, 
although there was some substitutions for “more serious” problems as well.  Surprisingly, 
evidence from the RAND HIE found that increased cost sharing for prescription drugs resulted in 
lower use of over the counter products(70). 
 
Effects of drug user fees on patient health status .  All of the studies on this issue have 
examined the overall effect of changes in drug user fees on direct or indirect indicators of patient 
health.  No studies have assessed the intermediate effects of drug user charges on compliance and 
the effects of compliance on health status.   
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In arguably the most compelling study to date, Tamblyn et al(52) assessed the effects of 
sweeping changes to the Quebec public drug benefit program.  Beginning in 1996, seniors, social 
assistance recipients and other program beneficiaries faced large increases in drug user fees; user 
fee revenues were used to finance the extension of public drug coverage to the previously 
uninsured population.  The imposition of copayments on social assistance recipients caused an 
increase in hospitalizations / institutionalizations, physician visits and emergency department 
visits of 194%, 22% and 106%, respectively.  Among the elderly the increase in copayments 
caused increases in the same three categories of 35%, 13% and 50%, respectively.  These 
changes were even more marked among those with psychiatric problems and those with asthma, 
diabetes, epilepsy and heart disease.   
 
Several other studies are broadly consistent with Tamblyn’s findings, but appear to be less 
convincing.  Soumerai et al(71) exploited the natural experiment created by the imposition of a 
three prescription per month cap in the New Hampshire Medicaid program; this policy change 
did not occur in the neighbouring state of New Jersey.  The cap was associated with an increase 
in rates of admission to nursing homes, but not to hospitals for Medicaid recipients aged 60 and 
older.  When the cap was replaced by a $1 per prescription charge, the probabilities of nursing 
home admission declined but, in general, the patients who were admitted to these did not return 
to the community.  It is difficult to assess if the nursing home admissions reflected increased 
morbidity associated with the 3 prescription cap.  First, if patients were becoming ill, then one 
would expect hospitalizations to increase as well.  Second, because the 3 prescription cap did not 
apply in nursing homes, it is plausible that patients were entering nursing homes to circumvent 
the prescription cap.  Third, the authors’ use of all-cause hospitalization may not be sensitive to 
specific adverse health events attributable to the prescription cap. 
 
Soumerai et al(72) then assessed the effect of the same monthly cap on outcome measures in a 
more narrowly defined study population: the use of psychotropic drugs and acute mental health 
care by permanently disabled, noninstitutionalized patients with schizophrenia, 19 through 60 
years of age, who were insured by New Hampshire Medicaid.  Again matched controls from the 
New Jersey Medicaid program were used.  The cap resulted in decreases in the order of 15 – 49% 
in the use of antipsychotic drugs, antidepressants and lithium, and anxiolytic and hypnotic drugs.  
The cap also produced an increase of 1-2 visits per patient per month to community mental health 
centres and sharp increases in the use of emergency mental health services and partial 
hospitalization but not in the frequency of psychiatric hospital admissions.  Once again, when the 
cap was replaced by the $1 copay the use of most mental health services reverted to base- line 
levels.  Emergent mental health service provision is presumably sensitive to adverse health 
outcomes associated with medication non-compliance in a psychiatric population.  The increased 
visit rates to community mental health centers is, however, plausibly related to the fact that these 
centers provided free medications after the cap was imposed. 
 
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment(48;73-75) tracked the health status of non-elderly 
individuals randomly assigned to different levels of drug charges, but drug charges were 
perfectly confounded with charges for physician services.  The study found that for the 94% of 
the non-elderly population – those with no pre-existing health problems and who were not poor, 
the imposition of user charges on both drugs and medical services had little effect on health 
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status.  But there were subgroups who were adversely affected by charges.  As Keeler et al(74) 
note: “for clinically defined hypertensives, blood pressures with free care were significantly 
lower (1.9 mm Hg) than with cost-sharing plans, with a larger difference for low-income 
hypertensives than for high- income hypertensives (3.5 vs. 1.1 mm Hg), but similar differences 
for blacks and whites. The cause of the difference was the additional contact with physicians 
under free care; this led to better detection and treatment of hypertensives not under care at the 
start of the study.  Free care also led to higher compliance by hypertensives with diet and 
smoking recommendations and higher use of medication by those who needed it.”  Brook et 
al(75) note that full health care insurance improved the vision for those with visual impairments 
(vision better by 0.2 Snellen lines).  Newhouse et al(73) found that the provision of free dental 
care improved the oral health of those with low income. 
 
Using monthly time series data over the period 1971-1982, Lavers(25) modeled the effects of 
rising charges for prescription drugs offered by the UK National Health Service on population 
level morbidity, defined as the average weekly number of new claims submitted each month by 
employed persons for sickness benefits.  Lavers found a negative association between drug 
charges and contemporaneous illness claims: each 10% rise in the user fees for drugs lowered 
illness claims by 6%, although this estimate was not statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels.  One cannot help but be skeptical of the statistical methodology.  First, one 
would expect drug charges to affect health status only after a several month lag.  Second, one 
questions whether important explanatory variables, such as unemployment rates and infectious 
disease rates, which were not included in the statistical model of explaining monthly sickness 
claims, could have rendered estimates inconsistent.   
 
Other studies(29;34;38;43;51;52;55;76;77) have indirectly examined the effects of cost sharing 
on health status by monitoring the use of drugs whose withdrawal could have important effects 
on health status.  Such drugs include anti-hypertensives, anti-coagulants, anti-psychotic, diabetic 
and thyroid agents. The consensus from these studies is that drug user fees reduce the use of such 
essential drugs, suggesting that health could be adversely affected.  It should be noted, however, 
that for the decrease in the use of “essential” medications to have an adverse effect on health 
status, it must first be established that the pre-cost-sharing utilization of these drugs was 
medically warranted(78).  But these studies do not have access to information on the clinical 
indications for their use.  An exception is Foxman et al(47) who used clinical records to 
distinguish the effects of cost sharing on changes to both appropriate and inappropriate antibiotic 
prescribing. 
 
Effects of drug user fees on health care costs.  As mentioned previously, the short term impact 
of drug charges is to reduce drug program expenditures.  The longer term impacts depend on the 
effect of charges on patient health and the attendant effects of use of prescription drugs as well as 
on hospitalizations, physician billings and related services.  User fees are expected to have 
particularly adverse effects on the health of populations with compromised health and limited 
ability to pay – hence the one might expect that user fees might not necessarily decrease their 
total health care costs.  This is consistent with the research evidence.  Roemer et al(79) assessed 
the effects of a $US0.50 copayment on prescription drugs and a $US1 copayment on physicians’ 
services for lower income patients, and found decreased drug and physician costs, but increased 
total costs because of higher hospital costs.  Soumerai(72) estimated that when New Hampshire 
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imposed a cap of three reimbursable prescriptions per month on its Medicaid population that 
overall costs for psychiatric patients went up 17 times more than the resulting savings on 
psychiatric medications.  Some part of these costs are attributable to factors other than reduced 
patient health status: visits to community mental health centre increased because these centers 
dispensed psychiatric medications without charge.   Similarly, Lingle et al(60) provide evidence 
that low income seniors whose medications were subsidized by the New Jersey Pharmaceutical 
Assistance Program for the Aged had fewer hospitalizations compared to similar low income 
seniors in a neighbouring state without drug subsidies.  Johnson et al(44) report that drug fees 
assessed to higher income seniors enrolled in a health maintenance organization was not 
associated with higher medical care (office visits, emergency department visits, home healthcare 
visits and hospitalizations) use and cost. 
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Appendix 2  Details of the sampling frame of the National Population Health 
Survey 
 
For the purposes of sampling, the population of Canada’s provinces, with the exception of 
Quebec, was stratified first into three geographic regions with differing population density 
(Major Urban Centres, Urban Towns and Rural Areas) and within these regions by “geographic 
and/or socio-economic strata”.  A total of 72 strata representing combinations of population 
density, geographic and/or socio-economic strata were sampled.  Within each stratum, primary 
sampling units (PSUs) known as Census Enumeration Areas (EAs) were randomly selected for 
inclusion in the NPHS, where the inclusion probability was proportional to population size.  In 
most strata, six EAs were selected.  Dwellings within these EAs were then enumerated and 
occupied dwellings (households) were selected for inclusion into the survey. A total of 1,863 
enumeration areas were selected from these strata. 
 
In Quebec, the NPHS sample was selected from dwellings interviewed in the 1992-93 Santé 
Québec Enquête sociale et de santé.  Sampling of the 16,010 dwellings proceeded using a two-
stage design.  Dwellings were stratified first into four geographic regions with differing 
population density (Montreal Census Metropolitan Area, regional capitals, small urban 
agglomerations and the rural sector) and within these regions by 15 Health Regions.  A total of 
72 strata representing combinations of population density, Health Region strata were sampled.  
Within each stratum, dwellings were further stratified into PSUs by socio-economic 
characteristics; PSUs were randomly selected with selection probability proportional to size.  
Selected PSUs were enumerated and random samples of their dwellings were drawn.   
 
Several restrictions were placed on the inclusion of geographical strata, EAs within strata, and 
households within EAs.  First, to ensure adequate representation from all of the ten provinces, a 
minimum of 1,200 households from each province were interviewed.  Four of the provinces 
chose to increase their allotted sample size through the purchase of additional observations.  
Second, as is described below, the survey was administered to one household member, chosen at 
random, who will also respond to future rounds of the NPHS.  This method under-represents 
persons from large households because they have less chance of being chosen; similarly persons 
from small households – often older single people or the elderly – are over-represented.  To 
increase the representation of parents and youths in the sample, a proportion of households that 
have no member aged under 25 years were excluded.5  In order to maintain the required sample 
sizes, the number of households visited in each province is increased by the anticipated number 
of households excluded in this way. 
 
Once a household was selected for inclusion into the survey, the questionnaire was administered 
in two stages.  The first stage was an in-person interview by a Statistics Canada employee with 
one respondent, aged 12 years and older (referred to as the index respondent) in which 
information on chronic health problems, activity limitation, health care services use and socio-
demographic status of all household members was collected.6  The index respondent responded 
                                                 
5 In the 1994-95 NPHS, a total of 6443 households were eligible for exclusion from the sample on this 
basis.  Of these, 3447 were actually rejected because no household member was under 25 years of age. 
 
6 Statistics Canada plans to re-interview 5/6 of the sample every 2 years.  Should a household be re-
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both on behalf of himself or herself (self- report) and on behalf of other household members 
(proxy-report).  This information is contained in “General” section of the survey database.  
Detailed information on health status, disease risk factors, and drug use of just the index 
respondent was collected also using an in-person interview.  This information is contained in the 
“Health” section of the survey database.  Computer Assisted Interviewing was used in all stages 
of questionnaire administration to decrease the likelihood of transcription errors.  The response 
rate for the General section of the survey was 89% and the response rate for the Health section of 
the survey was 96%. 
 
There were several exceptions to these survey administration rules.  First, the government of 
British Columbia purchased additional observations on residents living in specific areas of the 
province.  Most of these additional units (788 of 849) were surveyed via telephone using the 
Random-Digit-Dialing (RDD) sample of telephone numbers.  Second, the selected index 
respondent was sometimes not available due to illness or incapacity.  In these cases, another 
household member was chosen to be the proxy respondent.  In future interviews with the same 
household, however, the household member initially chosen as the index respondent will resume 
his or her role as index respondent, if able to do so.  Third, the entire interview took an average 
of 1 hour to complete.  In cases where time was limited, the in-person interview was completed 
via telephone.   
                                                                                                                                                              
interviewed, the same index respondent will be contacted. 
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Appendix 3: Population frequency distribution of marginal drug cost to seniors by 
province and NPHS survey year 
 
 
BC AB SK MB ON MDC 
1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 
0.00 1.37%       16.09% 100.00% 3.97% 
2.00          73.15% 
5.93           
5.99  100.00%         
6.11          17.19% 
6.15 98.63%          
6.18           
6.34           
6.50           
6.73           
6.92           
7.02   24.13%        
7.05           
8.69       20.28%    
8.88           
9.05           
9.14     2.69%      
9.46      2.39%     
10.01    95.31%       
10.48           
10.53   75.87%        
10.94    4.69%       
14.45           
14.85           
25.38           
26.11     97.31%      
27.04      97.25%     
27.34      0.37%     
28.83          0.72% 
28.96       79.72%    
29.93           
30.18        53.05%   
30.96        30.86%   
35.89          4.96% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Appendix 3: Population frequency distribution of marginal drug cost to seniors by 
province and NPHS survey year (continued) 
 
 
PQ NB NS PE NF MDC 
1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 
0.00 37.86% 21.11% 7.10% 3.06% 6.13% 8.32%   0.63% 0.63% 
2.00 62.14% 2.33%         
5.93  51.39%         
5.99           
6.11           
6.15           
6.18  25.16%         
6.34     93.87%      
6.50         94.81%  
6.73      89.09%     
6.92      2.58%     
7.02           
7.05   92.90%        
8.69    0.00%       
8.88          0.26% 
9.05    96.94%       
9.14           
9.46           
10.01           
10.48          93.84% 
10.53           
10.94           
14.45        100.00%   
14.85       100.00%    
25.38         4.56%  
26.11           
27.04           
27.34           
28.83           
28.96           
29.93          5.27% 
30.18           
30.96           
35.89           
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Appendix 4: Population frequency distribution of marginal drug cost to social assistance 
recipients by province and NPHS survey year 
 
 
BC AB SK MB ON MDC 
1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 
0 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 2.43% 
2     100.00% 100.00%    97.57% 
3           
4           
6.18           
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
 
Population frequency distribution of marginal drug cost to social assistance recipients by 
province and NPHS survey year (continued) 
 
 
PQ NB NS PE NF MDC 
1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 1994 1996 
0 100.00% 22.18%   100.00%  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
2   100.00%        
3      100.00%     
4    100.00%       
6.18  77.82%         
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
Other appendices available from the author by request 
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